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“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”1
A decade ago, Justice Scalia made prophetic statements regarding the 
First Amendment.  He said that because the Pledge of Allegiance 
includes the phrase “under God,” recital of the Pledge appears to raise an 
Establishment Clause issue.2  He went on to say, 
   In Barnette [the Supreme Court] held that a public school student could not be 
compelled to recite the Pledge; [the Supreme Court] did not even hint that she 
could not be compelled to observe respectful silence—indeed, even to stand in 
respectful silence—when those who wished to recite it did so.  Logically, that 
ought to be the next project for the Court’s bulldozer.3
These statements were prophetic because the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals recently held that the words “under God” in the Pledge violate 
the Establishment Clause.4  The Ninth Circuit reached this conclusion 
despite the fact that the United States Supreme Court has consistently 
distinguished the use of the phrase “under God” in the Pledge and other 
similar invocations as not violating the Establishment Clause from other 
practices, such as holiday displays and displays of religious referents 
like the Ten Commandments on government grounds, that do violate the 
Establishment Clause.5
 1. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 2. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 639 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Newdow v. United States Cong., 292 F.3d 597, 612 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. 
granted in part, Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 540 U.S. 945, 945 (2003), 
rev’d, 124 S. Ct. 2301 (2004), reh’g denied, 125 S. Ct. 21 (2004).  Certiorari was limited 
to: 
(1) Whether respondent has standing to challenge as unconstitutional a public 
school district policy that requires teachers to lead willing students in reciting 
the Pledge of Allegiance; and (2) Whether a public school district policy that 
requires teachers to lead willing students in reciting the Pledge of Allegiance, 
which includes the words ‘under God,’ violates the Establishment Clause of 
the First Amendment, as applicable through the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The Supreme Court did not decide the case on its merits (question two from above), as it 
decided that Mr. Newdow did not have standing to bring this suit.  Newdow, 124 S. Ct. at 
2305.  Despite no decision on the merits, there are interesting concurring opinions that 
will be discussed infra note 52. 
 5. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 603 (1989) (“[T]here is an 
obvious distinction between crèche displays and references to God in the motto and the 
pledge.”); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 788–92 (1983) (discussing the constitutionality 
of Nebraska’s legislature opening with a prayer by a state-employed clergyman, the 
Court states, “[t]o invoke Divine guidance on a public body entrusted with making laws 
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This type of inconsistency in results is the norm, not the exception, in 
Establishment Clause cases.6  In order to eliminate inconsistent results 
and promote predictability in litigation, a more uniform test should be 
developed and applied in Establishment Clause cases.  Equally important 
reasons for establishing a more uniform test include resolving inherent 
problems in the current tests employed by the Supreme Court and 
reassuring religious believers that religion has a proper place in society.  
The Establishment Clause is an issue that has been commented on for 
decades, but a decision as to which test is appropriate to employ in these 
cases needs to be made now to prevent the consequence of religion being 
removed from the public arena entirely. 
Part I of this Comment will delineate the inherent problems with the 
two main tests currently utilized by the Supreme Court in Establishment 
Clause cases: the Lemon7 test and the endorsement test.8  Part II will 
further highlight the flaws of the Lemon and endorsement tests by 
is not, in these circumstances, an ‘establishment’ of religion or a step toward 
establishment; it is simply a tolerable acknowledgment of beliefs widely held among the 
people of this country.”); Freethought Soc’y v. Chester County, 334 F.3d 247, 264 (3d 
Cir. 2003) (“Of course, we agree that [O’Connor’s] examples of ‘ceremonial deism’ are 
not violations of the Establishment Clause, e.g., the opening of court with the 
introduction ‘God save the United States and this Honorable Court’ (used in this very 
Court), or the inscription ‘In God We Trust’ on U.S. coins.”). 
 6. The Lemon and endorsement tests are applied in a wide variety of 
Establishment Clause cases.  Compare Marsh, 463 U.S. at 784–86 (holding that the 
Nebraska Legislature’s practice of opening each legislative day with a prayer by a 
chaplain paid by the State does not violate the Establishment Clause), with N.C. Civil 
Liberties Union Legal Found. v. Constangy, 947 F.2d 1145, 1152 (4th Cir. 1991) 
(concluding that courtroom prayer violates the Establishment Clause); compare Murray 
v. City of Austin, 947 F.2d 147, 149, 156 (5th Cir. 1991) (concluding that the City’s 
insignia, containing a Latin cross and used on police cars, letterhead, uniforms of city 
employees, etc. does not violate the Establishment Clause), with Harris v. City of Zion, 
927 F.2d 1401, 1413–14 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that Zion’s seal, incorporating a shield 
draped with a ribbon reading “God Reigns” and a Latin cross, violates the Establishment 
Clause); compare Freethought, 334 F.3d at 270 (concluding that the Ten 
Commandments plaque affixed to the Chester County Courthouse does not violate the 
Establishment Clause), with Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282, 1285, 1297 (11th Cir. 
2003) (holding that the placement of the Ten Commandments monument in the 
courthouse rotunda violates the Establishment Clause), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1000 
(2003).  But see Shannon P. Duffy, Two Tablets Cause a Big Headache, 228 LEGAL 
INTELLIGENCER 1 (July 7, 2003), available at WL 7/7/2003 TLI 1 (suggesting that the 
factual differences between the plaque in Freethought and the monument in Glassroth do 
not result in inconsistent holdings between the two circuits). 
 7. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
 8. See id. at 612–13; Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring). 




examining their application to “holiday display” cases9 and the recent 
“Ten Commandments”10 cases.  Part III will argue that applying a modified 
coercion test is the best means for achieving the most consistent results, 
even though it too has its limitations.  Part IV will compare the practical 
application of the modified coercion test to the holiday display11 cases, 
the recent Ten Commandments12 cases, and the “Pledge of Allegiance” 
case.13  Part V will conclude that keeping Church and State separate does 
not require the complete bifurcation of all things religious from the rest 
of society, and that the modified coercion test is best suited for achieving 
the goal of appreciation of and tolerance for divergent points of view in 
the United States. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In its refusal to “be confined to any single test or criterion” in 
Establishment Clause cases, the Supreme Court has employed various 
tests over the last fifty years: the child benefit theory, the neutrality 
theory, the Lemon test, the traditions test, the denominational preference 
theory, the endorsement test, and the coercion test.14  Of these, the 
Lemon test and the endorsement test have been used most often.15
A.  The Lemon Test 
The Lemon test consists of three prongs.  Any given statute, act, or 
display must: (1) have a secular legislative purpose, (2) have a principal 
 9. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 578; Lynch, 465 U.S. at 670–71. 
 10. Freethought, 334 F.3d at 249–50; Glassroth, 335 F.3d at 1284. 
 11. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 578; Lynch, 465 U.S. at 670–71. 
 12. Freethought, 334 F.3d at 249–50; Glassroth, 335 F.3d at 1284. 
 13. Newdow v. United States Cong., 292 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. granted in 
part, Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 540 U.S. 945, 945 (2003), rev’d, 124 S. Ct. 
2301 (2004), reh’g denied, 125 S. Ct. 21 (2004). 
 14. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 679; see also Jon Veen, Note, Where Do We Go From 
Here? The Need for Consistent Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 52 RUTGERS L. REV. 
1195, 1200–17 & nn.42, 49, & 164–66 (2000) (“The term child benefit theory is one term 
used by scholars to discuss the Court’s analysis in Everson [although the Court itself did 
not employ this term in Everson]. . . .  The Court formulated the neutrality theory [in 
Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp] . . . .  The Supreme Court created the Lemon test in 
[Lemon]. . . .  [T]he traditions test [was used in Walz and Marsh] . . . .  Larson v. Valente 
was one of the few cases in which the Supreme Court used the denominational 
preference theory . . . .  Justice O’Connor first articulated the endorsement test in 
Lynch. . . .  [And t]he coercion test actually has its roots in Engel v. Vitale. . . .  [But, t]he 
landmark case involving the coercion test is Lee v. Weisman. . . .”). 
 15. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583 n.4 (1987) (“The Lemon test has 
been applied in all cases since its adoption in 1971, except in Marsh v. Chambers.”); see 
also Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 597 n.47 (“The Court . . . proceeds to apply the controlling 
endorsement inquiry . . . .”). 
KAHLE 4/7/2005  10:28 AM 
[VOL. 42:  349, 2005]  Making “Lemon-Aid” 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 353 
 
or primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) not 
foster excessive government entanglement with religion.16  This test was 
first formulated in Lemon v. Kurtzman in 1971, as an attempt to draw 
lines consistent with the primary evils that the Establishment Clause 
sought to avoid.17  Those evils consisted of the government’s 
“sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement” in religious 
activity.18  The Court did not discuss why these prongs are particularly 
important or helpful in deciding Establishment Clause cases, but simply 
accumulated these criteria from prior decisions.19  There is one unifying 
theme, however, connecting these prior cases: government neutrality.20  
 16. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971).  In Lemon, the Court 
applied this three-pronged test and struck down two statutes that provided for 
reimbursing for the cost of teachers’ salaries, textbooks, and instructional materials at 
nonpublic schools.  Under each statute, aid was given to church-related schools, which 
the Court found to be unconstitutional.  Id. at 607. 
 17. Id. at 612. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id.  The Court simply stated: 
   Every analysis in this area must begin with consideration of the cumulative 
criteria developed by the Court over many years.  Three such tests may be 
gleaned from our cases.  First, the statute must have a secular legislative 
purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither 
advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster “an excessive 
government entanglement with religion.” 
Id. at 612–13 (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968) and Walz v. Tax 
Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)) (citations omitted). 
 20. See Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 214–15 (1963) (“Judge 
Alphonso Taft . . . in an unpublished opinion stated the ideal of our people as to religious 
freedom as one of ‘absolute equality before the law, of all religious opinions and 
sects’ . . . .  ‘The government is neutral, and, while protecting all, it prefers none, and it 
disparages none.’”); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962) (“[The] first and most 
immediate purpose [of the Establishment Clause] rested on the belief that a union of 
government and religion tends to destroy government and to degrade religion.”); Torcaso 
v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961) (“We repeat and again reaffirm that neither a State 
nor the Federal Government can constitutionally force a person ‘to profess a belief or 
disbelief in any religion.’”); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 441–42 (1961) (“But, 
the First Amendment, in its final form, did not simply bar a congressional enactment 
establishing a church; it forbade all laws respecting an establishment of religion.”); 
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312 (1952) (“There cannot be the slightest doubt that 
the First Amendment reflects the philosophy that Church and State should be 
separated.”); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 211 (1948) 
(rejecting the arguments that the First Amendment was only intended to prohibit 
governmental preference of one religion over another and that the Fourteenth 
Amendment did not make the First Amendment applicable to the States); Everson v. Bd. 
of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) (“Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up 
a church.  Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one 
religion over another.”); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (“The First 




The Court finds government neutrality to be the proper goal because of 
the problems that the fusion of government and religion can cause.21  To 
achieve government neutrality, the Court noted that, in considering the 
Establishment Clause eight times in the previous one hundred years, it 
consistently held that Congress was to have no power regarding 
religious belief or its expression.22
1.  Arguments Supporting Use of the Lemon Test 
Supporters of the Lemon test have argued that the test provides the 
proper framework for Establishment Clause cases insofar as it fosters the 
separationist philosophy that Church and state should remain separate.23  
Proponents of the Lemon test maintain that its separationist philosophy 
is sound because it respects religious and irreligious beliefs, safeguards 
the political community from the damaging effects of religious and 
irreligious exclusions, and protects religion’s role in society.24  Because 
citizens can suffer from governmental actions that attack their religious 
or irreligious beliefs, the government should respect these beliefs.25  The 
Lemon test furthers this goal by prohibiting the government from taking 
action that disrespects the religious or irreligious beliefs of individual 
citizens.26
Proponents of the Lemon test also argue that the test assists in 
maintaining a religiously inclusive political community.27  Because the 
government communicates to its citizens that some people are “insiders” 
while others are “outsiders” whenever it disrespects religious or 
irreligious beliefs, the Lemon test aims to protect citizens from negative 
Amendment declares that Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion or prohibiting free exercise thereof.  The Fourteenth Amendment has rendered 
the legislatures of the states as incompetent as Congress to enact such laws.”). 
 21. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 222 (stating that neutrality must be the goal because 
“powerful sects or groups might bring about a fusion of governmental and religious 
functions or a concert or dependency of one upon the other to the end that official 
support of the State or Federal Government would be placed behind the tenets of one or 
of all orthodoxies” and the Establishment Clause prohibits this). 
 22. Id.  Rather, the Court has 
consistently held that the [Establishment] clause withdrew all legislative power 
respecting religious belief or the expression thereof.  The test may be stated as 
follows: what are the purpose and the primary effect of the enactment?  If 
either is the advancement or inhibition of religion then the enactment exceeds 
the scope of legislative power as circumscribed by the Constitution. 
Id. 
 23. Daniel O. Conkle, Toward a General Theory of the Establishment Clause, 82 
NW. U. L. REV. 1113, 1172 (1988). 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 1176. 
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feelings associated with exclusion.28  Thus, because the Lemon test protects 
individual citizens, proponents of the test assert that it also protects the 
corresponding interests of the entire political community.29  Those who 
support the Lemon test also contend that it protects religion’s role in 
society.30  This argument relies on the fact that governmental support of 
religion is often unhelpful, if not counterproductive, to “genuine religion.”31
Another argument in support of the Lemon test is that rigorous 
application of the test is the best means of providing adequate protection 
against impermissible government involvement with religion.32  Proponents 
have argued that this is especially true in light of the Court’s decisions in 
Lynch v. Donnelly and Marsh v. Chambers, where the Court primarily 
focused on the historical nature of a particular religious activity in 
determining its constitutionality.33  This is because a historical inquiry 
approach threatens consistency in Establishment Clause jurisprudence as well 
as the First Amendment protections that application of the Lemon test 
has secured.34
The Lemon test is also defended on the grounds that there are not any 
real defects with the test itself, but that the problems instead stem from 
the Court’s “nonapplication, malapplication, and misapplication” of it.35  
 28. Id. at 1176–78. 
 29. Id. at 1176. 
 30. Id. at 1179–80. 
 31. Id. at 1180.  Conkle gives three reasons as to why governmental action 
designed to benefit religion does not, in fact, actually benefit religion.  First, democracy 
operates according to secular arguments and political bargaining, neither of which is 
well-suited for religious considerations.  Id.  Second, because there are widespread 
differences regarding religion, even among mainstream religions, any governmental 
action designed to support religion will be so general that the “religion” supported will 
be mild at best, but will most likely be meaningless.  Id. at 1181.  Finally, governmental 
“support” for religion is not really “support” at all.  Rather than strengthening religion, 
governmental support tends to “degrade and cheapen religion.”  Id.  Conkle also defines 
“genuine religion” as religion that is intrinsically sound, or at least perceived to be 
intrinsically sound, by religious believers.  Id. at 1180. 
 32. Kenneth Mitchell Cox, The Lemon Test Soured: The Supreme Court’s New 
Establishment Clause Analysis, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1175, 1201–03 (1984). 
 33. Id. at 1201–02. 
 34. Id. at 1202. 
 35. Carole F. Kagan, Squeezing the Juice from Lemon: Toward a Consistent Test 
for the Establishment Clause, 22 N. KY. L. REV. 621, 634 (1995).  Interestingly, 
however, Kagan proposes a modified Lemon test.  Id. at 645.  She advocates that the first 
prong, that there be a secular purpose, is not difficult to apply, so it should be retained in 
Establishment Clause analysis.  Id.  Kagan also says that the second prong, that the 
primary effect neither advance nor inhibit religion, should also be closely examined, but 
that governmental action as a whole should be reviewed.  She states that a statute or state 




Therefore, proponents of the Lemon test argue that it should not be 
discarded for two reasons: (1) it reinforces the proper goal of government 
neutrality; and (2) it is unclear as to which test should replace the Lemon 
test.36
 2.  Arguments Against Use of the Lemon Test 
Despite these arguments in favor of the Lemon test, there are some inherent 
difficulties with the test.  Some of these difficulties are highlighted by 
judicial dissatisfaction with the test.  For example, the test’s usefulness in 
providing concrete answers in Establishment Clause cases is questioned 
by Justice Kennedy as he notes that Supreme Court cases simply refer to 
the test as a “helpful signpost” or “guideline.”37  One main difficulty with 
the Lemon test, and one reason why justices are dissatisfied with it, is 
that it requires a determination of subjective legislative intent. 
There are several roadblocks to determining legislative intent, which 
is necessary under the first prong of the Lemon test.  The first obvious 
hurdle is the fact that Congress is made up of many individuals who 
support various pieces of legislation for vastly different reasons.38  Can it 
program “should not be gauged solely by its effect on religious institutions, but in light 
of the goals of the program in toto.”  Id. at 646.  Finally, Kagan discusses the dilemma 
that the entanglement prong can pose.  She notes that a government entity seeking to 
distance itself from a religious institution or message may monitor that institution or 
message too closely in ensuring that government and religion are not entangled.  Thus, in 
an effort to not entangle itself with religion, the government will still be excessively 
entangled with religion by virtue of its efforts to prevent such entanglement.  Id. at 647–48.  
To avoid this problem, Kagan proposes that the entanglement prong be narrowed so that 
excessive entanglement is only found when the government’s involvement is not 
“content neutral.”  Id. at 648.  This would result in the government not being able to 
inquire into a religious institution’s messages simply to make sure that the state is not 
sponsoring a religious message, but would allow the government to inquire into religious 
institutions on the basis of some other factor, such as health and safety or tax monitoring.  
Id.  Kagan says that this would not constitute excessive entanglement because “the 
inquiry is based upon neutral factors applied to all bodies equally, rather than upon the 
religious message conveyed.”  Id.  The formulation of a modified test seems to contradict 
Kagan’s assertion that “the Court’s difficulty with the test lies not in any defect or want 
of reasoning in the test . . . .”  Id. at 634. 
 36. Id. at 644–45. 
 37. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 656 (1989) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part).  Justice Kennedy expresses further distaste for 
the test when he states, “[I] do not wish to be seen as advocating, let alone adopting, 
[this] test as our primary guide in this difficult area.”  Id. at 655. 
 38. See Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 870 (1929–1930).  
In discussing discovering legislative intent when a statute is ambiguous, Radin states: 
   That the intention of the legislature is undiscoverable in any real sense is 
almost an immediate inference from a statement of the proposition.  The 
chances that of several hundred men each will have exactly the same 
determinate situations in mind as possible reductions of a given determinable, 
are infinitesimally small.  The chance is still smaller that a given determinate, 
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really be said that a group of people, with different motives and objectives, 
enacted a given piece of legislation for one single purpose?39  Ascertaining 
legislative intent would remain difficult even if there were only one 
legislator representing a legislature.40
Another problem is that inquiring into legislative intent gives legislators 
an incentive to lie.41  If legislators who voted to pass legislation on 
account of their religious beliefs knew that the legislation would be 
struck down as a violation of the Establishment Clause if their religious 
motives became known, these legislators would have reason to lie.  To ensure 
the litigated issue, will not only be within the minds of all these men but will 
be certain to be selected by all of them as the present limit to which the 
determinable should be narrowed.  In an extreme case, it might be that we 
could learn all that was in the mind of the draftsman, or of a committee of half 
a dozen men who completely approved of every word.  But when this draft is 
submitted to the legislature and at once accepted without a dissentient voice 
and without debate, what have we then learned of the intentions of the four or 
five hundred approvers? 
Id. at 869–70.  This discussion represents the most obvious difficulty with ascertaining 
legislative intent: the relationship between the intent of a collective legislature and the 
intentions of the individual legislators. 
 39. Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment 
Neutrality and the “No Endorsement” Test, 86 MICH. L. REV. 266, 284 (1987). 
 40. GERALD C. MACCALLUM, JR., LEGISLATIVE INTENT AND OTHER ESSAYS ON 
LAW, POLITICS, AND MORALITY 5 (Marcus G. Singer & Rex Martin eds., 1993).  
MacCallum states: 
The fundamental question “what was the legislator’s intent” subsumes a 
number of more specific questions: 
1. Was his intent to enact a statute—i.e., was the “enacting” performance not, 
perchance, done accidentally, inadvertently or by mistake? 
2. Was his intent to enact this statute—i.e., was this the document (the draft) 
he thought he was endorsing? 
3. Was his intent to enact this statute—i.e., are the words in this document 
precisely those he supposed to be there when he enacted it as a statute? 
4. Was his intent to enact this statute—i.e., do these words mean precisely 
what he supposed them to mean when he endorsed their use in the statute? 
5. How did he intend these words to be understood? 
6. What was his intent in enacting the statute—i.e., what did he intend the 
enactment of the statute to achieve? 
7.  What was his intent in enacting the statute—i.e., what did he intend the 
enactment of the statute to achieve in terms of his own career? 
Id. 
 41. See Smith, supra note 39, at 284; see also Jeffrey S. Theuer, Comment, The 
Lemon Test and Subjective Intent in Establishment Clause Analysis: The Case for 
Abandoning the Purpose Prong, 76 KY. L.J. 1061, 1072–73 (1988) (“The emphasis of 
the ‘purpose’ prong on individual intent appears to present a test too difficult to apply.  
The sources which reveal such intent can be ‘contrived and sanitized, favorable media 
coverage orchestrated, and post-enactment recollections conveniently distorted.’”) 
(footnotes omitted). 




that the legislation would survive an Establishment Clause attack, legislators 
would claim to support the legislation for every reason other than 
religious ones.  Because ascertaining legislative intent is a near impossible 
task, and because it is not necessarily accurate even when it is determined, it 
is not a helpful factor in deciding Establishment Clause cases.42
Subjective legislative intent is also not a useful inquiry because the 
Supreme Court has often refused to engage in intent questions.43  This is 
because a practical difficulty exists in determining legislative intent 
based upon inadequate or incomplete legislative records.44  Further, 
examining legislative intent is problematic because the issue of whose 
intent counts is disputed.45  For example, the Court has looked to 
legislative history and statements of purpose made by a statute’s sponsor 
to ascertain intent.46  One cannot assume, however, that all members 
voting for a particular piece of legislation agree with a statement made 
by one particular legislator regarding the purpose of the legislation.47  
Even if these statements or legislative history properly explain the 
purpose of a statute, a problem with the “purpose” prong remains:48 the 
 42. See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
Justice Scalia notes that in prior cases, the Supreme Court has held that the government 
may not act with the purpose of advancing religion, except (“now and then”) when the 
Free Exercise Clause says that it must.  Id.  The government can also act with the 
purpose of advancing religion when it seeks to eliminate existing government hostility 
(“which exists sometimes”) toward religion.  Id.  Finally, the government can act with 
the purpose of advancing religion when it is merely accommodating religious practices.  
Id.  Yet, at some point in accommodating religion (although “it is unclear where”), 
intentional accommodation is equivalent to fostering religion, which is obviously 
unconstitutional.  Id.  Therefore, according to Justice Scalia, these “cases interpreting 
and applying the purpose test have made such a maze of the Establishment Clause that 
even the most conscientious governmental officials can only guess what motives will be 
held unconstitutional.”  Id. 
 43. Theuer, supra note 41, at 1070.  Theuer notes that in United States v. O’Brien, 
391 U.S. 367, 383–84 (1968), Chief Justice Warren gave three reasons for rejecting a 
judicial standard based on legislative intent.  Id.  First, what certain people say about a 
given piece of legislation that they were involved in passing is not indicative of what the 
entire legislative body intended the legislation to mean or accomplish.  Id.  Second, if a 
piece of legislation were struck down because of illicit motives, the legislature could 
simply state new reasons for enacting a new law at a later time.  Id.  Third, taking motive 
into account could hinder the lawmaking process by allowing good laws with bad 
motives to be struck down.  Id. 
 44. Hal Culbertson, Religion in the Political Process: A Critique of Lemon’s 
Purpose Test, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 915, 917. 
 45. William B. Petersen, “A Picture Held Us Captive”: Conceptual Confusion and 
the Lemon Test, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1827, 1835 (1989). 
 46. Id. at 1836. 
 47. Id. at 1838. 
 48. Id.  Petersen argues that there would still be problems with ascertaining which 
statements accurately express legislative purpose and then assessing the truth of these 
statements.  Id.  Petersen questions whether or not courts should assume that legislatures 
are acting in good faith when they state what the “official” purpose of a given statute is.  Id. 
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assumption that the existence of a religious purpose behind a statute 
necessarily leads to a religious effect of the statute.49  These criticisms 
highlight the fact that legislative intent is difficult to ascertain, and not 
necessarily meaningful when it is determined, because religious purpose 
does not always translate into religious effect. 
The second prong of the Lemon test requires that the primary or 
principal effect of a statute, act, or display neither advance nor inhibit 
religion.  This requirement is problematic because it is often difficult to 
determine the primary or principal effect of any given statute, act, or 
display.  For example, in Wallace v. Jaffree, 50 the Supreme Court dealt 
with the constitutionality of a statute that authorized a period of silence 
for meditation or voluntary prayer.  The Court found that the legislative 
 49. Id. at 1842.  “[T]he Court often incorrectly assumes a causal relationship 
between the first two parts of the Lemon test, and concludes that a religious purpose 
necessarily leads to a religious effect.”  Id.  Some might object to this, however, stating 
that the existence of a religious purpose alone should be enough to invalidate a practice 
as unconstitutional.  Indeed, the Court itself has construed the Lemon test in this way.  
See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 582–83 (1986) (“The Establishment Clause 
forbids the enactment of any law ‘respecting an establishment of religion.’  The Court 
has applied a three-pronged test [the Lemon test] to determine whether legislation 
comports with the Establishment Clause. . . .  State action violates the Establishment 
Clause if it fails to satisfy any of these prongs.” (footnote omitted)).  One prong of the 
Lemon test is that the legislature must have adopted the law with a secular purpose.  Id. 
at 583.  Thus, laws that do not have a secular purpose can be invalidated solely on this 
ground.  In Edwards, the Court struck down a Louisiana statute that prohibited the 
teaching of evolution in public schools unless creation science was also taught.  Id. at 
593–94.  The statute was deemed unconstitutional because the appellants failed to 
identify a clear secular purpose for the statute.  Id. at 585; see also Stone v. Graham, 449 
U.S. 39, 39, 41 (1980) (holding that a Kentucky statute that required the posting of the 
Ten Commandments on the wall of each public classroom in the state was 
unconstitutional because it had no secular legislative purpose).  It is not clear, however, 
why the presence of a religious purpose alone should invalidate a statute or practice if the 
statute or practice does not promulgate a religious effect.  See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 
472 U.S. 38, 56–57 (1985) (stating that the statute authorizing a one-minute moment of 
silence for meditation or voluntary prayer was unconstitutional because the “State did 
not present evidence of any secular purpose”).  In Wallace, there was no discussion 
regarding the statute’s advancement of religion independent of the Court’s analysis of 
legislative intent.  Id. at 60.  Thus, nothing in the opinion indicated that the practical 
effect of this statute (that voluntary prayer was one acceptable activity to engage in 
during the moment of silence) resulted in prayer occurring more frequently than prayer 
occurred before the statute was enacted (where only meditation was referred to).  If the 
statute has the same effect regardless of whether or not it was motivated solely by 
religious purposes, it is not necessary to deem it unconstitutional when motivated by 
religious purposes.  See also infra notes 52–56 and accompanying text. 
 50. 472 U.S. at 41–42. 




intent of the sponsor of the statute was clear in that case.51  The majority 
noted that there was only one significant textual difference—the addition 
of the words “or voluntary prayer”—between an earlier version of the 
statute and the statute at issue in the case.52  To the majority, this 
indicated that the State intended to characterize prayer as a favored 
practice.53  Chief Justice Burger, however, disagreed with the majority 
regarding the effect of the statute.54  He said that Alabama did not 
endorse prayer simply because it enacted a statute stating that voluntary 
prayer was one of several authorized activities during a moment of 
silence.55  Thus, for the majority, the primary effect of the statute was an 
endorsement of prayer as a favored practice, but for Justice Burger, the 
primary effect of the statute was to clarify what activities are authorized 
during a moment of silence. 
 51. Id. at 56–57.  The Court said legislative intent was clear because “[t]he sponsor 
of the bill that became § 16-1-20.1, Senator Donald Holmes, inserted into the legislative 
record—apparently without dissent—a statement indicating that the legislation was an 
‘effort to return voluntary prayer’ to the public schools.”  Id. 
 52. Id. at 59.  The earlier version of the statute, § 16-1-20, stated, “a period of 
silence, not to exceed one minute in duration, shall be observed for meditation.”  Id. at 
40 n.1.  The statute at issue in this case, § 16-1-20.1, stated, “a period of silence not to 
exceed one minute in duration shall be observed for meditation or voluntary prayer.”  Id. 
at 40 n.2 (emphasis added).  Interestingly, in Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow, 
there was only one significant textual difference between the Pledge of Allegiance as 
originally written in 1892 and the Pledge of Allegiance as amended in 1954: the addition 
of the words “under God” in 1954.  124 S. Ct. 2301, 2305–06 (2004), reh’g denied, 125 
S. Ct. 21 (2004).  There was a minor amendment made to the Pledge in the 1920s, where 
“my Flag” was changed to “the flag of the United States of America.”  Id. at 2305.  In 
1892, the Pledge was written as follows: “I pledge allegiance to my Flag and the 
Republic for which it stands: one Nation indivisible, with Liberty and Justice for all.”  
In 1954, the words “under God” were added to the Pledge so that it read: “I pledge 
allegiance to the Flag of the United States of America, and to the Republic for which it 
stands, one Nation under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all.”  Id. at 2306.  
Based on the Court’s rationale in Wallace v. Jaffree, one might expect the Supreme 
Court in Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow to have concluded that the 
addition of the words “under God” to the Pledge in 1954 indicated treatment of Christian 
religions as favored religions in the United States.  The majority in Newdow, however, 
never reached the merits of the case.  Id. at 2305.  In contrast, Chief Justice Rehnquist and 
Justice O’Connor wrote concurring opinions discussing the constitutionality of the Pledge of 
Allegiance.  Id. at 2316–27.  Both Justices concluded that the Pledge of Allegiance, 
which includes the words “under God,” does not violate the Establishment Clause.  Id. at 
2312, 2323.  Chief Justice Rehnquist reasoned that the addition of the words “under 
God” to the Pledge was merely a recognition that “[f]rom the time of our earliest history 
our peoples and our institutions have reflected the traditional concept that our Nation 
was founded on a fundamental belief in God.”  Id. at 2320 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 1693, 
83d Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1954)).  Similarly, Justice O’Connor concluded that the words 
“under God” are mere “ceremonial deism,” see supra note 5, based on four factors: 
history and ubiquity, absence of worship or prayer, absence of reference to particular 
religion, and minimal religious content.  Id. at 2323–27. 
 53. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 60. 
 54. Id. at 85 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
 55. Id. 
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Which effect is truly primary makes an enormous difference because 
it affects the determination of whether or not the statute violates the 
Establishment Clause.  Under the majority’s view, the statute violated 
the Establishment Clause, but under Burger’s view, the statute would not 
violate the Establishment Clause.56  It is not helpful to employ a test 
whose results hinge on a subjective factor that is difficult to ascertain, 
such as the primary or principal effect of a statute.  If reasonable minds 
differ as to the primary or principal effect of a given statute, act, or 
display, can it really be said that the statute, act, or display has a primary 
or principal effect at all?  The primary or principal effect thus seems to 
depend upon the perception of the majority of people, or at least the 
majority of Supreme Court Justices.  This is further problematic because 
a main goal of the Establishment Clause is to protect the beliefs of those 
in the religious minority from those in the religious majority.57
Finally, the Lemon test requires that the statute, act, or display must 
not foster excessive government entanglement with religion.  The primary 
problem with this prong is ascertaining the definition of “excessive.”58  
 56. Id. at 61. 
 57. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).  
Whose perceptions, then, should count in this type of inquiry?  There are two options, 
better seen in the context of the endorsement test, which will be taken up in the next 
section.  See infra notes 82–91 and accompanying text.  For now, it is enough to say that 
it is inherently contradictory to proclaim that a statute, act, or display has a certain 
principal or primary effect when not everyone examining the statute, act, or display 
perceives the same principal or primary effect. 
 58. The Court has discussed what should be examined to determine whether or not 
a particular practice is “excessive,” but has not discussed what degree of governmental 
involvement with religion qualifies as “excessive.”  For example, in Walz v. Tax Commission, 
397 U.S. 664, 675 (1970), the Court noted that “the questions are whether the involvement is 
excessive, and whether it is a continuing one calling for official and continuing surveillance 
leading to an impermissible degree of entanglement.”  Further, in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 
403 U.S. 602, 615 (1971), the Court stated, “[i]n order to determine whether the 
government entanglement with religion is excessive, we must examine the character and 
purposes of the institutions that are benefited, the nature of the aid that the State 
provides, and the resulting relationship between the government and the religious 
authority.”  Finally, in Lynch, the Court said, “[e]ntanglement is a question of kind and 
degree.  In this case, however, there is no reason to disturb the District Court’s finding 
on the absence of administrative entanglement.”  465 U.S. at 684.  This is because there 
was no evidence that the city contacted church authorities regarding the content and 
design of the display, no maintenance expenses were necessary, and “[i]n many respects 
the display require[d] far less ongoing, day-to-day interaction between church and state 
than religious paintings in public galleries.”  Id.  These explanations of whether or not a 
particular practice constitutes excessive government entanglement with religion seem to 
cast the definition of “excessive” in the light of “I’ll know it when I see it,” as opposed to 
describing factors or guidelines indicating what degree of involvement is in fact “excessive.” 




Is the government required to set itself outside of religious affairs 
altogether (a complete “hands-off” approach)?  May it acknowledge religion?  
May it make accommodations for religious practices?  A complete hands-off 
approach is an impossible goal when the Free Exercise Clause prevents 
Congress from prohibiting the free exercise of religion.59  If the government 
must protect the religious freedoms of its individual citizens, it cannot 
remain completely outside of religious affairs.60  It thus appears that it is 
at least acceptable for government to acknowledge religion, but may 
government also make accommodations for it? 
The distinction between acknowledgment and accommodation, however, 
may not always be substantial enough to distinguish between excessive 
and nonexcessive government involvement.  For example, if the government 
provides that employees can be excused from work on their religious 
days of Sabbath, is this an acknowledgment that some people are 
religious and believe that certain days of the week are holy and should 
therefore be devoted to God, not work?61  Or, is this an accommodation 
of the religious beliefs of these citizens?  If we say that government may 
acknowledge religion, but may not accommodate it, how would the 
government proceed in the above example?  Even if we assume that 
excusing employees from work is a mere acknowledgment of religion 
(which, no doubt, many people would disagree with), is it so obvious 
that the government would still not be excessively entangled with 
religion?  That is, in the government’s earnestness to ensure that it is only 
acknowledging religion, it might closely monitor workplace practices to 
make sure that acknowledgment of religion is not rising to the level of 
religious accommodation.  Would not, then, this close monitoring be 
considered excessive entanglement?62  Thus, the government has the dilemma 
of not being able to exempt itself from religious involvement, while 
also running the risk that mere acknowledgment of religion could 
 59. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 60. See Jesse H. Choper, The Free Exercise Clause: A Structural Overview and an 
Appraisal of Recent Developments, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 943, 947–48 (1986): 
On the one hand, the Court has read the establishment clause as saying that if a 
law’s purpose is to aid religion, it is unconstitutional.  On the other hand, the 
Court has read the free exercise clause as saying that, under certain 
circumstances, the state must aid religion.  Logically, the two theses are 
irreconcilable. 
 61. Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136, 146 (1987) 
(holding that Florida’s refusal to provide appellant with unemployment benefits violated 
the Free Exercise Clause because “the State may not force an employee ‘to choose 
between following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, . . . and 
abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order to accept work’”) (quoting 
Sherbert v. Verner 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963)). 
 62. E.g., Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 768–69 (1976) (White, J., 
concurring) (saying the entanglement prong is “insolubly paradoxical”). 
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simultaneously be excessive entanglement with religion. 
As demonstrated above, all three prongs of the Lemon test contain 
inherent flaws that prevent the test from being practically workable in a 
satisfactory manner.  Application of the Lemon test in actual cases has 
also failed.  For example, in Aguilar v. Felton,63 use of the Lemon test 
completely failed in its goal of providing government neutrality with 
respect to religion.64  Although the Lemon analysis does not require that 
all three prongs be violated for a practice to be deemed unconstitutional, 
this is precisely one of the problems with the Lemon test, and is 
especially evident in Aguilar.65  Application of the Lemon test to the 
facts of Aguilar resulted in the disturbing conclusion that government 
aid to underprivileged children violated the First Amendment, although 
it was never established that the purpose of the aid was religious in 
nature or that the aid itself had the effect of advancing religion.  Indeed, 
the program was deemed unconstitutional because of the government’s 
desire to assure that the program was not associated with religion.66  For 
these reasons, the Lemon test ought to be abandoned. 
 63. 473 U.S. 402 (1985). 
 64. In Aguilar, the Court struck down a New York program authorizing the 
Secretary of Education to provide financial assistance to local schools, including 
parochial schools, to meet the needs of educationally deprived children from low-income 
families.  Id. at 404, 414.  Public school personnel volunteered to run the program, and 
were told to “avoid involvement with religious activities . . . conducted within the private 
schools and to bar religious materials in their classrooms.”  Id. at 406–07.  The program 
was nevertheless held unconstitutional because it fostered excessive government 
entanglement with religion, even though there was no discussion that the program was 
exclusively motivated by nonsecular purposes or that it had the effect of advancing 
religion.  Id. at 409. 
 65. In Aguilar, there was no evidence that the program was inspired by religious 
motives or that the program had the effect of advancing religion.  In fact, the program 
was held unconstitutional because the state surveillance needed to ensure that religion 
did not pervade the program would have been “excessive.”  Id. at 413.  Chief Justice 
Burger addressed this issue, stating, “[w]hat is disconcerting about the result reached 
today is that . . . the Court does not even attempt to identify any threat to religious 
liberty . . . .”  Id. at 419 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).  Chief Justice Burger went on to say 
that the Court’s duty is not to mechanically apply formulas, but rather is to “determine 
whether the statute or practice at issue is a step toward establishing a state religion.  
Federal programs designed to prevent a generation of children from growing up without 
being able to read effectively are not remotely steps in that direction.”  Id. 
 66. This is anomalous and undesirable, but is not the only example of the failure of 
the Lemon test in practical application.  Additional cases in which employing the Lemon 
test has failed will be discussed infra Part II. 




B.  The Endorsement Test 
The endorsement test focuses primarily on the first and second prongs 
of the Lemon test.  This test asks what the government’s actual purpose 
was in passing a particular statute, erecting a certain display, or engaging 
in a specific act, and then asks what the effect of the statute, display, or 
act is, regardless of the government’s actual purpose.67  This test was set 
forth in Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly.68  
O’Connor suggested this test as a clarification of current Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence because it was unclear to her how the Lemon test 
protected the principle of prohibiting impermissible government interaction 
with religion guaranteed by the First Amendment.69  O’Connor stated 
that to determine whether or not there has been unconstitutional 
government action with respect to religion, one must examine what the 
government intended to communicate, as well as what message was 
actually conveyed.70  This inquiry forms the two-pronged analysis that is 
the endorsement test. 
1.  Arguments Supporting Use of the Endorsement Test 
One positive aspect of this test is that it emphasizes that the 
government should not communicate that anyone is either an “insider” 
or an “outsider” on account of his or her religious beliefs.71  In connection 
with prohibiting the government from placing a badge of inferiority on 
some of its citizens, the endorsement test also seeks to assure government 
neutrality toward all religions in a culturally diverse society.72  This 
neutrality that the endorsement test seeks is consistent with the mandates 
of the First Amendment because it requires respect for different beliefs.73
 67. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).  
O’Connor formulates the endorsement test as follows: 
The purpose prong of the Lemon test asks whether [the] government’s actual 
purpose is to endorse or disapprove of religion.  The effect prong asks whether, 
irrespective of [the] government’s actual purpose, the practice under review in 
fact conveys a message of endorsement or disapproval.  An affirmative answer 
to either question should render the challenged practice invalid. 
Id. 
 68. Id. at 687. 
 69. Id. at 687–89. 
 70. Id. at 690. 
 71. See Arnold H. Loewy, Rethinking Government Neutrality Towards Religion 
Under the Establishment Clause: The Untapped Potential of Justice O’Connor’s Insight, 
64 N.C. L. REV. 1049, 1051 (1986). 
 72. Id. 
 73. Christopher S. Nesbit, Note, County of Allegheny v. ACLU: Justice 
O’Connor’s Endorsement Test, 68 N.C. L. REV. 590, 611 (1990) (stating that, at a 
minimum, the Establishment Clause requires that the government not prefer one 
religious sect or creed over another because “the first amendment has always required 
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The endorsement test is also commendable because it allows the 
government to make certain accommodations for both minority and 
mainstream religions.74  Additionally, the endorsement test’s rejection of 
government acts communicating that certain citizens are outsiders appeals 
to humane instincts.75  Finally, the Supreme Court has adopted the 
endorsement test as “a sound analytical framework.”76  In County of 
Allegheny v. ACLU, the Court formally adopted the endorsement test, 
even though the Lemon test (as applied in Lynch v. Donnelly regarding a 
holiday display) was controlling law at the time.77
2.  Arguments Against Use of the Endorsement Test 
Despite this support, there are three main flaws inherent in the 
endorsement test.  First, what type of endorsement does the test refer to?  
complete respect for religious diversity in society”).  Respect for religious diversity is 
not achieved when the government does not act neutrally toward religion because the 
government “cannot endorse the religious practices and beliefs of some citizens without 
sending a clear message to nonadherents that they are outsiders or less than full members 
of the political community.”  Id. 
 74. Jesse H. Choper, The Endorsement Test: Its Status and Desirability, 18 J.L. & 
POL. 499, 501, 508 (2002).  Governmental accommodations of religion are not permitted 
under the Lemon test because the goal of accommodations is to avoid burdening 
religious activity, making it difficult to say that assisting religion is not the purpose of 
these accommodations.  Id. at 501.  Yet, the Court has required religious exemptions 
under the Free Exercise Clause and has even approved of some accommodations that are 
not constitutionally required.  Id.  For example, the Court has held that religious 
conscientious objectors can be excused from military service, see Selective Draft Law 
Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 389–90 (1918), that Amish schoolchildren can be excused from 
compulsory education laws, see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207 (1972), and that 
while exemption from a Sunday Closing law for Orthodox Jews is not constitutionally 
required, such treatment is permissible, see Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 608–09 
(1961).  Id.  Choper contends that these accommodations should be constitutional because 
“[i]t reasons that relieving burdens that generally applicable regulations impose on 
members of some faiths neither ‘endorses’ those religions, nor makes nonbelievers nor 
members of the non-benefited religions feel they have been disparaged because of their 
faith.”  Id. at 508–09. 
 75. Id. at 509. 
 76. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 595 (1989). 
 77. Id. at 597 (“Since Lynch, the Court has made clear that . . . we must ascertain 
whether ‘the challenged governmental action is sufficiently likely to be perceived by 
adherents of the controlling denominations as an endorsement, and by the nonadherents 
as a disapproval, of their individual religious choices.’”) (quoting Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 
U.S. 373, 390 (1985)); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 685 (1984) (holding that “the 
city has a secular purpose for including the crèche, that the city has not impermissibly 
advanced religion, and that including the crèche does not create excessive entanglement 
between religion and government”). 




Second, how do we ascertain government intent?  Finally, whose views count 
in the perception that government has endorsed or disapproved of religion?78
The first difficulty with the endorsement test is determining the 
prohibited types of endorsement.  The government can engage in exclusive 
preferment endorsement, endorsement of truthfulness, endorsement of 
value, or accommodation endorsement.79  While it may seem intuitive 
that exclusive preferment endorsement by the government should always 
be prohibited by the Establishment Clause, it is less clear whether or not 
endorsements of value or accommodation endorsements should be 
violations.80  If we cannot even distinguish which type of endorsement is 
appropriate from which type of endorsement is inappropriate, how is the 
“endorsement” test supposed to work?  This inherent flaw eliminates the 
usefulness of the endorsement test in and of itself, but there are still 
other problems with the test. 
 78. Smith, supra note 39, at 291.  Determining what type of endorsement the 
endorsement test refers to is difficult because endorsement connotes approval, but 
approval may take various forms.  Id. at 276.  Deciding whose perceptions count in the 
perception that the government has either endorsed or disapproved of religion is also 
difficult because we do not know whether it is the perceptions of real human beings or 
the perceptions of the hypothetical “objective observer” that count.  Id. at 291–92. 
 79. Id. at 276–77.  Exclusive preferment endorsement refers to the notion that 
believers of different religious faiths assume that not all religions can be correct because 
they differ in their doctrines, practices, and claims to divine authority.  Id.  Thus, there 
have been disputes over which religion is the true religion.  Id. at 277.  If the government 
indicated that it accepted one particular religion as the true religion, it would be engaging 
in exclusive preferment endorsement.  Id.  Endorsement of truthfulness refers to the 
notion that the government could express that certain religious doctrines are true without 
saying that a particular religion is the true religion.  Id.  Endorsement of value reflects 
the idea that the government can express that religion is generally valuable because it 
instills qualities of good citizenship or helps maintain civil peace.  Id.  Finally, 
accommodation endorsement refers to the concept that the government can acknowledge 
that many citizens care deeply about religion and that these religious concerns merit 
respect and accommodation by the government.  Id. 
 80. Id. at 278–83.  Steven Smith posits several ways in which the concept of 
endorsement can be made clearer, but concludes that none of the modifications is very 
fulfilling.  Id.  For example, the government could prohibit all types of the 
aforementioned variants of endorsement, but refusing to accommodate religious beliefs 
may lead to disapproval of religion when the government often acknowledges and 
accommodates various citizen interests, and this would be a violation of the 
Establishment Clause.  Id. at 278.  The government could only permit accommodation 
endorsements, but “the line separating accommodation endorsements from endorsements 
of truthfulness or value is so thin as to be virtually invisible.”  Id. at 279.  The 
government could permit accommodation endorsements and endorsements of value, but 
then there are difficulties in allowing the government to say that religion is “good,” but 
not that it is “true” because there is no reliable way of determining whether or not school 
prayer, publicly sponsored nativity scenes, etc. indicate that the religious ideas they 
represent are “good” or “true.”  Id. at 282.  Finally, the government could engage in 
accommodation endorsements, value endorsements, and truthfulness endorsements, but 
not engage in exclusive preferment endorsement.  Id. at 282–83.  The problem with this 
alternative is that these endorsements would prohibit too little, and thus would not be 
appealing to proponents of a no endorsement test.  Id. at 283. 
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A second difficulty with the endorsement test is the requirement of 
ascertaining subjective legislative intent.  This is the same difficulty that 
appears under the Lemon test.  The prior discussion regarding the problems 
with subjective legislative intent also applies here to demonstrate why 
discerning the intent of legislators is difficult, and not all that meaningful 
even when it is determined.81
The final impediment to applying the endorsement test to Establishment 
Clause cases is the problem of determining whose views count in the 
perception that the government has either endorsed or disapproved of 
religion.  One possibility is to use a “real” person’s perception—that is, 
if a real person would perceive that the government has endorsed or 
disapproved of religion, then the act would violate the Establishment 
Clause.82  Or, perhaps the perceptions of a “hypothetical objective observer” 
should be used to determine whether the government has endorsed or 
disapproved of religion.83  Should the perceptions of real people or the 
hypothetical objective observer matter?  Both options have inherent 
problems. 
If the perceptions of real people are to be protected under the 
endorsement test, there are so many differing religions and religious 
beliefs in the United States that practically anything the government 
does could be seen by someone to be an endorsement or disapproval of 
religion.84  This is a problem because allowing one person’s perceptions 
of governmental endorsement or disapproval of religion to invalidate an 
 81. See supra notes 38–49 and accompanying text.  It is not necessary to reiterate 
the same intent problems under this test that appear in the Lemon test, except to say that 
the intent problem is still present in the endorsement test, working against the test’s 
usefulness for deciding Establishment Clause cases. 
 82. Justice O’Connor emphasizes the fact that “[e]ndorsement sends a message to 
nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an 
accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the 
political community.”  Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  This would 
lead one to believe that the effect of endorsement upon “real” people is the primary 
concern of the endorsement test. 
 83. Although Justice O’Connor stressed how governmental endorsement of 
religion affects “real” people in Lynch, she stated in Wallace v. Jaffree that “[t]he 
relevant issue is whether an objective observer, acquainted with the text, legislative 
history, and implementation of the statute, would perceive it as a state endorsement . . . .”  
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 76 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring).  From O’Connor’s 
contradictory statements, it is not easy to discern whether the endorsement test is actually 
concerned with the “hypothetical objective observer” or whether it focuses on “real” 
people. 
 84. Smith, supra note 39, at 291. 




action would result in governmental paralysis.85  The First Amendment 
is designed to protect the rights of all citizens and therefore cannot 
logically stand for the proposition that if one person finds an action 
offensive, the action must be invalidated. 
On the other hand, it may be that only the perceptions of the “hypothetical 
objective observer” are relevant.  Adopting this view, however, results in 
an inconsistency in the reasoning behind adopting the endorsement test 
in the first place.  The endorsement test was developed to prevent the 
government from sending messages to nonbelievers that they are 
outsiders.86  Yet, an objective observer would be familiar with the text, 
legislative history, and implementation of the practice under review.87  
Because he or she would thus possess the tools to know exactly what the 
legislators intended, he or she will only perceive endorsement when 
legislators intend to endorse.88
The same is not true of real people.  Real people may perceive 
endorsement where legislators did not intend to endorse, and real people 
may not always perceive endorsement where legislators did intend to 
endorse.89  The objective observer does not protect against making 
citizens feel like outsiders in either of these situations.  If real people do 
not perceive endorsement where the legislature intended to endorse, then 
they will not feel like outsiders (even though the objective observer 
perceives an intent to endorse).90  In cases where “real” people perceive 
an intent to endorse where no such legislative intent to endorse exists, 
the “objective observer” would not protect these interests because the 
“objective observer” would know that the legislators are not intending to 
endorse; thus, the “objective observer” would not perceive endorsement.91
Determining which type of endorsement is prohibited under the 
endorsement test is difficult, and ascertaining legislative intent is 
virtually impossible.  Furthermore, deciding whose perceptions count 
leads to problems whether or not the perceptions of “real” people or the 
“hypothetical objective observer” are adopted.  For these reasons, the 
endorsement test should not be utilized in Establishment Clause cases. 
 85. Id.  Indeed, Justice O’Connor herself realizes this problem, noting: “Given the 
dizzying religious heterogeneity of our Nation, adopting a subjective approach would 
reduce the [endorsement] test to an absurdity.”  Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 
124 S. Ct. 2301, 2321 (2004), reh’g denied, 125 S. Ct. (2004). 
 86. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688. 
 87. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 76 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 88. Smith, supra note 39, at 293–94. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 294–95. 
 91. Id. at 294. 
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II.  APPLICATION OF THE LEMON AND ENDORSEMENT TESTS 
One of the most obvious ways in which the flaws of the Lemon and 
endorsement tests can be seen is in their application to actual cases.  
Even without the substantive criticisms outlined in Part I of this 
Comment, simply looking at the holdings and reasoning of the cases 
themselves shows the inadequacies of these tests.  There are several 
areas in which application of these tests yields inconsistent, and often 
incoherent, results.92  Two primary examples are the holiday display 
cases and the recent Ten Commandments cases.93  The results of these 
cases are wildly inconsistent, demonstrating the inherent flaws of the 
Lemon and endorsement tests. 
A.  Holiday Display Cases 
In Lynch v. Donnelly, the Supreme Court held that the holiday display 
of a crèche did not violate the Establishment Clause.94  In arriving at this 
conclusion, the Supreme Court began by acknowledging that church and 
state are not totally separable and that some relationship between the two 
is inevitable.95
The Court then discussed that its interpretation of the Establishment 
Clause is at least partially molded by “what history reveals was the 
 92. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 93. The holiday display cases include County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 
(1989) and Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).  The Ten Commandments cases are 
composed of Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 
1000 (2003), and Freethought Society v. Chester County, 334 F.3d 247 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 94. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687.  The city of Pawtucket, Rhode Island, erected a 
Christmas display each year as part of its observance of the Christmas season.  Id. at 671.  
The display was erected in a park owned by a non-profit organization, located in the 
heart of the shopping district, and was comprised of a Santa Claus house, reindeer, 
candy-striped poles, a Christmas tree, carolers, a clown, an elephant, a teddy bear, 
colored lights, a banner that read “Season’s Greetings,” and a crèche.  Id.  The crèche 
consisted of figures of the Infant Jesus, Mary, Joseph, angels, shepherds, kings, and 
animals, that ranged in height from five inches to five feet.  Id.  These detailed facts must 
be included in the discussion because “the Court consistently has declined to take a rigid, 
absolutist view of the Establishment Clause. . . .  [T]he Court has scrutinized challenged 
legislation or official conduct to determine whether, in reality, it establishes a religion or 
religious faith, or tends to do so.”  Id. at 678.  In other words, the Court takes an ad hoc 
approach with respect to Establishment Clause issues; each case is decided according to 
its particular facts.  Therefore, these specific facts must be included in the analysis of the 
Establishment Clause issue because the outcome of the case turns on these details. 
 95. Id. at 672. 




contemporaneous understanding of its guarantees.”96  The Court pointed 
to an act of the First Congress as indicative of what the Establishment 
Clause was understood to mean when it was first written.  The Court 
noted that Congress approved the Establishment Clause and enacted 
legislation providing for paid Chaplains for the House and Senate in the 
same week.97  Thus, it was clear that neither the Framers nor the 
Congress of 1789 viewed the employment of congressional Chaplains to 
give daily prayers in Congress as an establishment problem.98
Moreover, all three branches of government have officially acknowledged 
the role of religion in American life, from recognizing holidays with 
religious significance, to the statutorily prescribed motto “In God We 
Trust,” to “One Nation Under God” as part of the Pledge of Allegiance, 
to art galleries supported by public revenues that display religious 
paintings predominantly inspired by one religious faith.99
Acknowledging that some interaction between government and 
religion must exist, the Court decided that the focus of its inquiry into 
whether or not the crèche violated the Establishment Clause must be on 
the crèche in the context of the Christmas season.100  This is because 
focusing exclusively on the religious component of an activity would 
lead to its invalidation under the Establishment Clause.101  In examining 
the crèche in the context of the Christmas season, the Supreme Court 
seemed to simply assume that the crèche was not equivalent to 
governmental advocacy of religion.  The Court stated that the city’s use 
of the crèche was merely an act of acknowledging a significant historical 
religious event that has long been celebrated in the western world.102  
The Court maintained that celebrating and depicting the origins of this 
holiday were legitimate secular purposes.103  Thus, the Court concluded 
that the first prong of the Lemon test (that the statute, act, or display has 
a secular legislative purpose) was met without much discussion. 
The same is true regarding the Court’s analysis of the second prong of 
the Lemon test (that the display’s principal or primary effect neither 
advance nor inhibit religion).  The Court said that this prong would not 
be met unless display of the crèche were to be viewed as more of an 
endorsement of religion than spending public money on textbooks for 
 96. Id. at 673.  In other words, at least in this instance, the Supreme Court 
considered, and perhaps gave greater weight to, the original intent of the Framers 
regarding the First Amendment when deciding an Establishment Clause issue. 
 97. Id. at 674. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 674, 676. 
 100. Id. at 679. 
 101. Id. at 680. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 681. 
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students attending church-sponsored schools, spending public money to 
transport children to church-sponsored schools, or giving tax exemptions 
to church properties.104
The Court concluded that whatever benefit a religion, or all religions, 
received from displaying the crèche was merely indirect, remote, and 
incidental.105  The Court arrived at this conclusion by finding that 
display of the crèche did not advance or endorse religion any more than 
the federal government’s recognition of Christmas or the exhibition of 
religious paintings in governmentally supported museums.106  With this 
conclusion, the Court drew a line between constitutional and unconstitutional 
practices, but acknowledged that there is not necessarily one correct spot 
at which this line should be drawn.  This seemingly arbitrary line-drawing is 
seen in the Court’s reluctance to hold that the display of the crèche 
violated the First Amendment.107
The Court seems to convey that display of the crèche cannot be 
unconstitutional because, if it were, a lot of other practices would have 
to be declared unconstitutional; the Court was simply not willing to 
arrive at this result.  The Court did not really discuss why display of the 
crèche in and of itself did not advance religion.  It simply said that 
display of the crèche, in relation to other constitutionally valid practices, 
must also be constitutionally acceptable.108
 104. Id. at 681–82.  The Court apparently shifted the inquiry from whether or not 
the crèche advances or inhibits religion to whether or not display of the crèche confers a 
more substantial benefit to religion than other practices that the Court has upheld.  The 
Court, however, was honest about what it was doing.  The majority acknowledged the 
dissent’s argument that some observers might observe the crèche as the city aligning 
itself with the Christian faith, but responded that “our precedents plainly contemplate that 
on occasion some advancement of religion will result from governmental action. . . .  ‘[N]ot 
every law that confers an “indirect,” “remote,” or “incidental” benefit upon [religion] is, 
for that reason alone, constitutionally invalid.’”  Id. at 683 (quoting Comm. for Pub. 
Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 771 (1973)). 
 105. Id. at 683. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 685. 
 108. Id. at 681–82; see Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 17 (1947) (holding that 
New Jersey’s practice of utilizing tax-raised funds to reimburse parents for the cost of 
sending their children to parochial school, when New Jersey also reimbursed parents 
who sent their children to public and other schools, did not violate the First 
Amendment).  This case has never been overruled, but has been criticized as “out of line 
with the First Amendment.”  Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 443 (1962) (Douglas, J., 
concurring); see also Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 308, 312 (1952) (upholding a 
New York City program that allowed public schools to release students during the school 
day so that they could go to religious centers to receive religious instruction).  This case 
has not been overruled either, but it too has been criticized.  Justice Harlan said that 




With respect to the third prong (that the display not foster excessive 
government entanglement with religion), the Court noted that there was 
no evidence that the city ever contacted church authorities regarding the 
content or design of the display, the city did not have to spend money to 
maintain the crèche, and the city itself owned the crèche.109  There was 
nothing in the case resembling the “comprehensive, discriminating, and 
continuing state surveillance . . . present in Lemon.”110  Therefore, the 
Court held that display of the crèche did not foster excessive government 
entanglement between religion and government.111
Although the Supreme Court upheld the display of the holiday crèche 
in Lynch, it reached a conflicting result five years later in County of 
Allegheny v. ACLU.  The Court held that the display of a holiday crèche 
in the Allegheny County Courthouse violated the Establishment Clause, 
but that the display of a holiday menorah did not.112  The Supreme Court 
Zorach is unsound to the extent that it permits the government to shape its secular 
programs to accommodate the beliefs of religious groups because “legislation must, at 
the very least, be neutral” to conform to the requirements of the First Amendment.  
Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 360–61 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).  The 
Court essentially said that the crèche in Lynch must be constitutional because the 
practices in Everson and Zorach were constitutional.  Lynch, 465 U.S. at 681–82.  Yet, 
because Everson and Zorach had been criticized before the Court ruled on the display in 
Lynch, the Court should have addressed the continuing propriety of these practices in its 
opinion. 
 109. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 684. 
 110. Id.  Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 607 (1971), involved a Pennsylvania 
statute that provided financial support to nonpublic elementary and secondary schools by 
reimbursing these schools for the cost of teachers’ salaries, textbooks, and instructional 
materials in specified secular subjects and a Rhode Island statute under which the State 
paid directly to teachers in nonpublic elementary schools a supplement of 15% of their 
annual salary.  The Rhode Island statute further required that “any teacher applying for a 
salary supplement . . . first agree in writing ‘not to teach a course in religion for so long 
as or during such time as he or she receives any salary supplements.’”  Id. at 608.  The 
Court recognized, however, that ensuring that teachers at parochial schools who received 
state supplements to their salaries did not incorporate religious instruction in their 
classrooms would require “[a] comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state 
surveillance . . . to ensure that these restrictions are obeyed and the First Amendment 
otherwise respected.”  Id. at 619.  The same type of continuing surveillance would apply 
with respect to the Pennsylvania statute as the Pennsylvania statute “provide[d] state aid 
to church-related schools for teachers’ salaries.”  Id. at 620. 
 111. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 685. 
 112. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 621 (1989).  The crèche was 
displayed on the Grand Staircase of the Allegheny County Courthouse during the 
Christmas holiday season each year since 1981 by the Holy Name Society, a Roman 
Catholic group.  Id. at 579.  The crèche included figures of the infant Jesus, Mary, 
Joseph, farm animals, shepherds, and wise men, and also included an angel bearing a 
banner that proclaimed “Gloria in Excelsis Deo!”  Id. at 580.  The display also contained 
a plaque indicating it was donated by the Holy Name Society.  Id.  The county placed red 
and white poinsettia plants around the fence, together with a small evergreen tree 
decorated with a red bow, but no figures of Santa Claus or other decorations were 
included.  Id. at 580–81.  The Court recognized that the effect of a crèche display turns 
on its setting, thus the particular facts and details surrounding the crèche are of particular 
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concluded that the crèche display was a violation of the Establishment 
Clause because it demonstrated the county’s endorsement of Christianity.113
The Court began its analysis by recognizing that a crèche is capable of 
communicating a religious message.114  Yet, the Court distinguished the 
crèche in this case from the crèche in Lynch by saying that nothing in the 
context of the display in this case detracted from the crèche’s religious 
message, while such items as Santa’s house and reindeer drew attention 
away from the crèche itself in Lynch.115  The notion that either the 
presence of figurines of Santa Claus or other decorations elsewhere in 
the courthouse or the presence of flowers surrounding the crèche detracted 
from the crèche’s religious message was rejected in Allegheny.116  The 
Court emphasized the fact that the crèche was located on the Grand 
Staircase, “the ‘main’ and ‘most beautiful’ part of the building that is the 
seat of county government.”117  According to the Court, no viewer would 
reasonably think that the crèche would be placed in such a location 
without the support and approval of the government, despite the fact that 
a sign appeared next to the crèche indicating that a Roman Catholic 
organization owned the crèche.118  Instead of viewing the sign as an 
announcement that the display was sponsored by a religious organization, 
the Court saw the sign as a governmental endorsement of the religious 
organization’s message.119
The Court distinguished Allegheny from Lynch on the facts.120  The 
factual differences, however, are not necessarily persuasive.  First, the 
Court said that nothing detracted from the religious message of the 
importance and must be included in any analysis of the constitutionality of such a 
display.  Id. at 597. 
 113. Id. at 612–13. 
 114. Id. at 598. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 598–99. 
 117. Id. at 599. 
 118. Id. at 599–600. 
 119. Id. at 600. 
 120. The Court stated that Lynch stands for the proposition that the government may 
celebrate Christmas, but not in a way that endorses Christianity.  Id. at 601.  The Court 
then stated that Allegheny County crossed the boundaries delineated in Lynch by 
celebrating “Christmas in a way that has the effect of endorsing a patently Christian 
message: Glory to God for the birth of Jesus Christ.”  Id.  With this statement, the Court 
acknowledged that the holdings of Lynch and Allegheny were different, but that there 
was a valid reason for this difference; the display in Lynch was within the bounds of the 
First Amendment, but the display in Allegheny fell outside the permissible practices of 
the First Amendment.  Id. 




crèche in Allegheny, while secular decorations drew attention away from 
the crèche’s religious symbolism in Lynch.121  The problem with this 
purported factual distinction between the two cases is that nothing in the 
Lynch opinion referred to secular objects detracting from the crèche’s 
religious message as a factor in declaring the crèche to be constitutional.122  
Rather, the Court stated that it was not seeking to explain away the 
religious nature of the crèche, nor was it equating the crèche with a 
Santa’s house or reindeer.123  Second, the Court emphasized the location 
 121. See supra notes 94 & 112 and accompanying text. 
 122. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 666 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part): 
Crucial to the Court’s conclusion was not the number, prominence, or type of 
secular items contained in the holiday display but the simple fact that, when 
displayed by government during the Christmas season, a crèche presents no 
realistic danger of moving government down the forbidden road toward an 
establishment of religion. 
Some might argue that Lynch never addressed these secular objects because the Court 
utilized the Lemon test and found that display of the crèche did not advance religion.  
The argument would continue by saying that this is not the same inquiry that took place 
in Allegheny.  The Court focused on governmental endorsement of religion in Allegheny, 
as opposed to advancement of religion, making examination of secular objects necessary 
to determine how the presence of secular objects would affect a perception of 
governmental endorsement of religion.  A response to this argument is that application of 
either test should lead to the same result.  See, e.g., Daniel O. Conkle, Lemon Lives, 
43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 865, 874 (1993) (stating that “[t]he endorsement language of 
Justice O’Connor . . . is fully consistent with the essence of Lemon”).  Thus, if the two 
tests are consistent with one another, one might assume that they strive to achieve the 
same underlying goals and should therefore provide consistent results in practice.  Some 
might, however, argue that while it would be desirable for application of either test to 
lead to consistent results, Justice O’Connor did not necessarily intend for application of 
the endorsement test to always achieve the same results that application of the Lemon 
test would achieve.  See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687–89 (1984) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring).  O’Connor recognized: 
   The Establishment Clause prohibits government from making adherence to a 
religion relevant in any way to a person’s standing in the political community.  
Government can run afoul of that prohibition in two principal ways.  One is 
excessive entanglement with religious institutions . . . .  The second and more 
direct infringement is government endorsement or disapproval of religion. . . . 
    Our prior cases have used the three-part test articulated in Lemon v. 
Kurtzman as a guide to detecting these two forms of unconstitutional 
government action.  It has never been entirely clear, however, how the three 
parts of the test relate to the principles enshrined in the Establishment Clause. 
Id. (citations omitted).  This statement seems to indicate that the endorsement test is 
necessary because the Lemon test may not adequately protect Establishment Clause 
principles.  Accordingly, application of the endorsement test might produce different 
results than would application of the Lemon test, but, according to O’Connor, this would 
be desirable.  Also, O’Connor states that her suggested approach “leads to the same 
result in this case” as does application of the Lemon test.  Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687 
(emphasis added).  This implies that her endorsement analysis might not always lead to 
the same conclusions that application of the Lemon analysis would. 
 123. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 685 n.12. 
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of the crèche.124  The location of the crèche, just like the secular objects 
accompanying the display, is not mentioned anywhere in the Lynch 
opinion.125  In Lynch, the Court simply emphasized that the crèche had 
to be viewed in the context of the Christmas season.126  Finally, the 
entity that owned the crèche was another distinguishing factor that the 
Court focused on in Allegheny.127  If this distinction were truly factually 
relevant, it would seem to cut in favor of the crèche in Allegheny being 
declared constitutional, as opposed to unconstitutional.128
Another difference between Allegheny and Lynch is that the Supreme 
Court applied the endorsement test in Allegheny, but applied the Lemon 
test in Lynch.129  Applying two different tests may have led to the two 
different results in Allegheny and Lynch.  It is unclear, however, whether 
the results would have been different had the Court applied the same 
test. 
What is clear is that it would be most desirable to be able to employ 
either test and still achieve the same results.130  This is true for at least 
 124. See supra notes 94 & 112 and accompanying text. 
 125. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 666 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
 126. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 680; see also Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 665–66 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 127. See supra notes 94 & 112 and accompanying text. 
 128. This is because the crèche in Lynch was owned by the city of Pawtucket, while 
the crèche in Allegheny was owned by a Roman Catholic organization.  See Allegheny, 
492 U.S. at 667 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Nor can I 
comprehend why it should be that placement of a government-owned crèche on private 
land is lawful while placement of a privately-owned crèche on public land is not.”). 
 129. The language of Allegheny demonstrates this difference.  The majority opinion 
concluded that the crèche demonstrated that the county endorsed Christianity.  The 
majority was quite clear about employing the endorsement test as opposed to the Lemon 
test when it stated, “our present task is to determine whether the display of the crèche 
and the menorah, in their respective ‘particular physical settings,’ has the effect of 
endorsing or disapproving religious beliefs.”  Id. at 597.  The majority was less clear, 
however, about why it used the endorsement test as opposed to the Lemon test.  The 
majority mentioned that the general principles espoused by the five Justices in 
concurrence and dissent in Lynch “are sound, and have been adopted by the Court in 
subsequent cases.”  Id.  Thus, while it is clear that the Supreme Court has utilized the 
endorsement test since O’Connor first proposed it in her concurring opinion in Lynch, 
and it is clear that the Supreme Court decided to use the endorsement test in Allegheny, it 
is not entirely clear why the Supreme Court chose to employ the endorsement test in this 
case and whether or not it will exclusively rely on the endorsement test in future cases. 
 130. One purpose of court decisions is to state what is acceptable behavior in 
certain areas so that people may act accordingly.  If court decisions are inconsistent or do 
not clearly differentiate between what is acceptable and unacceptable behavior, people 
will not understand how to conduct themselves in particular situations and litigation will 




three reasons.  First, both the Lemon and endorsement tests are good law 
and can be used at any time in current Establishment Clause cases.  
Second, the Supreme Court did not indicate in Allegheny that it was 
undergoing a shift in policy or goals, or that it viewed Establishment 
Clause issues differently than it did when Lynch was decided, requiring 
use of the endorsement test to achieve objectives that it could not meet 
with the Lemon test.  Finally, the notion of “endorsement” has largely 
been absorbed into Lemon’s second prong.131  If endorsement is seen as 
one way in which the government advances religion, it would seem that 
application of the endorsement test should lead to the same result as if 
the Lemon test were employed. 
Perhaps even more compelling than these inconsistencies and 
contradictions between cases, however, are the inconsistencies and 
contradictions within cases.  Such was the situation in Allegheny, as the 
display of a crèche was held to be a violation of the Establishment 
Clause, but the display of a menorah was not.132
The Court began its discussion of the constitutionality of the menorah 
by noting that it was the “primary visual symbol for a holiday that, like 
Christmas, has both religious and secular dimensions.”133  The Court 
then noted that the tree was clearly the predominant element in the city’s 
display.134  It was at this point that the logic of the Court’s opinion began 
to falter.  The Court declared that the tree dominated the display and that 
Christmas trees, unlike menorahs, are not inherently religious symbols 
continue indefinitely until a clearer framework is provided.  For the sake of consistency 
and predictability, it would not be good public policy for the Supreme Court to employ 
multiple tests that could result in drastically different holdings. 
 131. See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 592.  The Court noted that the Lemon test has been 
regularly applied in Establishment Clause cases, but that recent decisions “have refined 
the definition of governmental action that unconstitutionally advances religion.  In recent 
years, we have paid particularly close attention to whether the challenged governmental 
practice either has the purpose or effect of ‘endorsing’ religion . . . .”  Id. 
 132. Id. at 621.  About one block from the courthouse, a display consisted of a 
forty-five-foot Christmas tree, an eighteen-foot menorah, and a sign that read “During 
this holiday season, the city of Pittsburgh salutes liberty.  Let these festive lights remind 
us that we are the keepers of the flame of liberty and our legacy of freedom.”  Id. at 582, 
587.  The menorah was owned by a Jewish group, but was stored, set up, and taken down 
by the city every year.  Id. at 587. 
 133. Id. at 613–14. 
 134. Id. at 617.  The problem with this statement is that the Court assumes that 
simply because the tree is forty-five feet high, while the menorah is only eighteen feet 
high, the tree must be the predominant element in the display.  This is not necessarily the 
case.  As Justice Brennan notes, it is entirely possible that the sight of an eighteen-foot 
menorah would be “far more eye catching than that of a rather conventionally sized 
Christmas tree.  It also seems to me likely that the symbol with the more singular 
message [in this case the menorah] will predominate over one lacking such a clear 
meaning.”  Id. at 642 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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because they typify the secular celebration of Christmas.135  From these 
statements, the Court reached the conclusion that the display communicated 
a secular celebration of Christmas and portrayed Chanukah as an 
alternative tradition.136
This quasi-syllogism is, however, flawed.  The Court basically operated 
under the major premise that the Christmas tree was the dominant 
element of the display.  The minor premise was that the Christmas tree 
was a secular symbol.  The conclusion was that because the dominant 
element was a secular one, the entire display must have been secular in 
nature.  This logic is severely impaired.  It is not reasonable to say that 
the display should be interpreted in light of the Christmas tree simply 
because the Christmas tree was the largest symbol.137  The Court 
recognized that a menorah is a religious symbol, but found it implausible 
to perceive the display of the tree, sign, and menorah as an endorsement 
of Judaism alone.138
 135. Id. at 616. 
 136. Id. at 618. 
 137. See supra note 134. 
 138. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 616 n.64.  The Court’s reasoning as to why this 
interpretation is “distinctly implausible” is puzzling.  The Court noted that during the 
time of the litigation, only 45,000 of Pittsburgh’s 387,000 people were Jewish.  Id.  
Whether or not a display violates the Establishment Clause, however, is not related to the 
percentage of the population who subscribe to a particular faith.  That is, Pittsburgh 
could violate the Establishment Clause by endorsing Judaism, and not Christianity, 
regardless of the number of Jewish people in the city.  The Court acknowledged this 
much by saying that Pittsburgh might endorse a minority faith by displaying a menorah 
alone.  Id.  The mention of the Jewish population is, therefore, irrelevant and confusing.  
What is more confusing, though, is the Court’s statement that “[w]hen a city like 
Pittsburgh places a symbol of Chanukah next to a symbol of Christmas, the result may be 
a simultaneous endorsement of Christianity and Judaism . . . .  But the city’s addition of 
a visual representation of Chanukah to its pre-existing Christmas display cannot 
reasonably be understood as an endorsement of Jewish—yet not Christian—belief.”  Id.  
This is an odd statement considering the fact that the Court states that Christmas trees are 
secular symbols of the Christmas holiday.  Id. at 616–17.  If a Christmas display simply 
acknowledges the secular aspects of the holiday by including a secular symbol (in this 
case, the Christmas tree), it is reasonable that the addition of a menorah could result in 
the display being understood as an endorsement of Jewish belief, but not as an 
endorsement of Christian belief.  Even more troubling is the Court’s assertion that the 
respective sizes of the tree and menorah cause the menorah’s meaning to depend upon 
the meaning of the Christmas tree.  Size of the symbols alone, however, need not be the 
determining factor.  See supra note 134.  Furthermore, one can easily think of a display 
where a forty-five-foot Christmas tree is surrounded by many smaller, yet highly 
religious, symbols.  In such a case, it would not be so simple to say that because the tree 
remains the largest element in the display, then naturally the whole display must be 
secular in nature. 




The Court also seemed to assume, without much discussion, that a 
Christmas tree is an entirely secular symbol.139  Although it may be true 
that Christmas trees have lost some of their religious significance over 
the years, especially when coupled with the notions of gift-giving and 
Santa Claus in contemporary life, this does not mean that Christmas 
trees are always secular and are not capable of being religious 
symbols.140  Also, given the religious symbolism of the menorah, it is 
reasonable that an observer might believe that the government is 
promoting both the Christian and Jewish religions.141  Yet, the Court 
rejected this possibility by saying that a predominantly secular symbol 
of Chanukah does not exist, so including a menorah is the city’s only 
real option.142  The Court came to this conclusion because it said that an 
eighteen-foot dreidel would look out of place in a holiday display and 
might be interpreted as mocking Chanukah.143  It is unclear why use of 
an eighteen-foot dreidel would certainly be inappropriate, while use of 
an eighteen-foot menorah is permissible.144
The factual distinctions that the Court said existed between the 
crèches in Lynch and Allegheny, as well as the distinctions between the 
crèche and the menorah within Allegheny are not too compelling.  The 
contrary holdings of Lynch and Allegheny, therefore, reflect inherent 
problems in both tests because application of either the endorsement test 
or the Lemon test should lead to the same result.  Thus, the endorsement 
and Lemon tests should be abandoned. 
 139. “Although Christmas trees once carried religious connotations, today they 
typify the secular celebration of Christmas. . . .  Numerous Americans place Christmas 
trees in their homes without subscribing to Christian religious beliefs . . . .”  Id. at 616–17. 
 140. In fact, if one were to “[c]onsider a poster featuring a star of David, a statue of 
Buddha, a Christmas tree, a mosque, and a drawing of Krishna . . . [there could] be no 
doubt that, when found in such company, the tree serves as an unabashedly religious 
symbol.”  Id. at 641 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 141. The majority acknowledged that the city used a religious symbol, the menorah, 
as its representation of Chanukah.  The majority also acknowledged that the city did not 
have reasonable alternatives that were less religious in nature.  Id. at 618. 
 142. Id. at 613–14.  The Court stated that “the menorah’s message is not exclusively 
religious.  The menorah is the primary visual symbol for a holiday that, like Christmas, 
has both religious and secular dimensions.”  Id. 
 143. Id. at 618. 
 144. The Court completely dismissed the possible use of the dreidel, a more secular 
symbol of Chanukah, by saying that some people might interpret an eighteen-foot dreidel 
as mocking the celebration of Chanukah.  Id.  Although this might be true, there is no 
discussion as to who would perceive an eighteen-foot dreidel in this manner or why the 
dreidel might be perceived in such a way.  It is not unreasonable that some people might 
indeed perceive an eighteen-foot menorah as mocking the celebration of Chanukah.  It is 
problematic for the Court to reach such conclusions without more discussion on the 
matter. 
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B.  Ten Commandments Cases 
The same inconsistency that is present in the holiday display cases 
also exists in the recent Ten Commandments cases.145  At first glance, 
there is a circuit split regarding whether or not display of the Ten 
Commandments on public land violates the Establishment Clause, as the 
Third Circuit recently held that a plaque of the Ten Commandments 
above a courthouse entrance did not violate the Establishment Clause, 
but the Eleventh Circuit found that display of a monument of the Ten 
Commandments in a courthouse rotunda did violate the Establishment 
Clause.146
There may not, however, be a circuit split at all.147  Because the factual 
surroundings of each display are of prime importance in determining 
Establishment Clause cases, it is possible that some displays would be 
violations of the Establishment Clause while other displays would not.  
Since each display is considered on an ad hoc basis, the specific 
circumstances surrounding each display could lead to different results.148  
However, an examination of the facts suggests that the application of the 
Lemon and endorsement tests, not the factual differences surrounding the 
displays of the Ten Commandments, is the cause of the inconsistent 
 145. Although the issue of whether or not plaques of the Ten Commandments can 
be placed on public grounds is not itself recent, this comment focuses on two recent 
cases: Freethought Society v. Chester County, 334 F.3d 247 (3d Cir. 2003) and 
Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1000 (2003).  
For older cases regarding this issue, see Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980) 
(holding that “Kentucky’s statute requiring the posting of the Ten Commandments in 
public school rooms has no secular legislative purpose, and is therefore unconstitutional”) and 
Anderson v. Salt Lake City Corp., 475 F.2d 29, 34 (10th Cir. 1973) (holding that a 
monument of the Ten Commandments on courthouse grounds does not violate the 
Establishment Clause). 
 146. Compare Freethought, 334 F.3d at 270 (holding that a plaque of the Ten 
Commandments displayed at an old entrance to the courthouse does not violate the 
Establishment Clause), with Glassroth, 335 F.3d at 1285, 1297 (holding that display of a 
monument of the Ten Commandments in the courthouse rotunda violates the 
Establishment Clause), Ind. Civil Liberties Union v. O’Bannon, 259 F.3d 766, 768–69, 
772 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that display of a monument of the Ten Commandments 
together with the Bill of Rights and the Indiana Constitution Preamble on state 
government property impermissibly endorses religion), and Adland v. Russ, 307 F.3d 471, 
489 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that display of a monument containing the Ten 
Commandments on Capitol grounds violates the Establishment Clause), reh’g en banc 
denied, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 25524 (6th Cir. Nov. 22, 2002), cert. denied, 583 U.S. 
999 (2003). 
 147. See Duffy, supra note 6. 
 148. See supra notes 94 & 112 and accompanying text. 





In Freethought Society v. Chester County,149 the Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit decided that a plaque above an old entrance to the 
Chester County Courthouse displaying the Ten Commandments was 
constitutional.150  The court began by determining the proper Establishment 
Clause framework, and recognized that it must either apply the Lemon 
test or the subsequent endorsement test which modifies and explains 
it.151  The court chose to apply the endorsement test, apparently because 
this is what recent Supreme Court decisions had done.152
In applying the endorsement test, the court considered the effect of the 
display on the reasonable observer, rather than the County’s purpose in 
erecting the display.153  With respect to the reasonable observer, the 
 149. 334 F.3d at 247. 
 150. Id. at 270.  The Chester County Courthouse accepted a plaque displaying the 
Ten Commandments from a religious group in 1920.  Id. at 249.  The plaque was placed 
near the entrance to the Courthouse and remained in that location for over eighty years.  
Id. at 249–50.  During that time, the County never did anything to draw attention to, 
celebrate, or maintain the plaque, but visitors to the Courthouse did pass the plaque on 
their way into the Courthouse.  Id. at 250.  That entrance has since been closed and 
visitors now enter the Courthouse via a new entrance, approximately seventy feet north 
of the plaque.  Id.  Visitors to the courthouse can see the title of the plaque, “The 
Commandments,” when walking on the sidewalk near the old entrance, but cannot see 
the text of the plaque unless they explicitly walk up to the old entrance.  Id. 
 151. Id. at 256.  The court noted that the Lemon test has been criticized by Supreme 
Court Justices.  See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 319 (2000) 
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 655–56 
(1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Comm. for Pub. Educ. & 
Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 671–72 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting); 
Books v. City of Elkhart, 235 F.3d 292 (7th Cir. 2000).  Despite these criticisms, Lemon 
has never been overruled. 
 152. Freethought, 334 F.3d at 258.  “Recent Supreme Court decisions . . . have not 
applied the Lemon test.  Instead . . . the Court has applied the endorsement test developed 
by Justice O’Connor, which dispenses with the ‘entanglement’ prong of the Lemon test 
and collapses its ‘purpose’ and ‘effect’ prongs into a single inquiry.”  Id. (quoting 
Tenafly Eruv Ass’n v. Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144, 174 (3d Cir. 2002), cert. 
denied, 539 U.S. 942 (2003)).  It is unclear as to whether there were any compelling 
reasons for the court to choose to apply the endorsement test over the Lemon test, other 
than recent criticism of the Lemon test.  See supra notes 130–31 and accompanying text, 
discussing that application of both tests should lead to the same result, thus application 
of one test over the other should not be viewed as a “better” course of action.  See also 
supra Part I (outlining the inherent problems of both the Lemon and endorsement tests, 
resulting in the conclusion that neither formulation should be applied, in its current form, 
to Establishment Clause analysis). 
 153. Freethought, 334 F.3d at 261.  This is problematic for a couple of reasons.  
First, the endorsement test is a two-part test inquiring into the government’s actual 
purpose in passing a particular statute, erecting a certain display, or engaging in a 
specific act, as well as inquiring into the effect of the statute, display, or act, regardless 
of the government’s actual purpose.  Therefore, on the face of the endorsement test, 
ascertaining legislative intent is necessary.  However, see supra Part I.A.2 regarding the 
difficulty of determining legislative intent and questioning the usefulness of doing so in 
the first place.  Second, the court’s action of ignoring the County’s purpose highlights 
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court adopted Justice O’Connor’s view that reasonable observers are 
presumed to have an understanding of the general history of the display 
and the community in which it is displayed.154
Within this framework, the court acknowledged that it could not 
“ignore the inherently religious message of the Ten Commandments.”155  
Despite the religious content of the plaque, the court said that the context 
surrounding the religious display could make it so that the overall 
display does not endorse religion.156  In Freethought, the court said that 
the age and history of the Ten Commandments plaque, not the objects 
surrounding it, changed the meaning such that an ordinarily religious 
plaque did not endorse religion in this instance.157  The court therefore 
decided that while a reasonable observer, in the abstract, might perceive 
the plaque as endorsing religion, the reasonable observer in this case 
would view the plaque as a reminder of the history of Chester County.158
The court said that, based on the age of the plaque, the reasonable 
observer views the Ten Commandments plaque as merely a longstanding 
historic plaque, and does not really view it as an endorsement of 
another problem with the endorsement test.  By ignoring governmental purpose, the 
constitutionality of the act depends upon the perceptions of reasonable observers.  Thus, 
who the reasonable observers are becomes very important.  See supra Part I.B.2 
(discussing the problems with using either “real” people or “hypothetical objective 
observers” under this prong of the endorsement test). 
 154. Id. at 259.  If this is truly the case, the court should have analyzed the effect of 
the display according to both what the intention of displaying the plaque was originally 
in 1920, as well as the intent behind the County’s refusal to remove the plaque in 2001.  
The court acknowledged that this analysis would be relevant to an inquiry regarding the 
County’s purpose under the Lemon test, but did not think it applied to considering the 
effect of the display.  Id. at 261–62. 
 155. Id. at 262. 
 156. Id. at 264; see also King v. Richmond County, 331 F.3d 1271, 1274, 1284 
(11th Cir. 2003) (holding that a county seal containing the words “Superior Court 
Richmond County, GA” as well as a sword and two tablets designed to resemble the text 
of the Ten Commandments did not violate the Establishment Clause because the 
presence of the sword made it reasonable that observers would understand the depiction 
of the Ten Commandments as a symbol of the secular legal system), reh’g en banc 
denied, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 21307 (Aug. 6, 2003). 
 157. Freethought, 334 F.3d at 264.  There were other plaques and monuments near 
the Ten Commandments plaque, including a no-smoking sign, plaques concerning 
Courthouse hours and building access, and a no-skateboarding sign, but the court did not 
believe that these signs changed the effect of the Ten Commandments plaque on the 
reasonable observer.  Id. at 254, 264.  Age and history, however, changed the effect of 
the plaque because a reasonable observer is presumed to be aware of the history of the 
plaque.  Id. at 264.  As such, the reasonable observer in this case would know that the 
plaque had been displayed on the courthouse for eighty years.  Id. at 264–65. 
 158. Id. at 265. 




religion.159  This contradicts the court’s acknowledgment that “history 
by itself may not be sufficient to change an otherwise religious display 
into something that is not perceived by the reasonable observer as an 
endorsement of religion.”160  The court recognized that historical 
acceptance of a practice does not make the practice constitutional, but 
then failed to take into account the entire historical context surrounding 
the erection of the plaque.161
If the reasonable observer is presumed to know the history of the 
display, the observer presumably knows the entire history, including the 
circumstances surrounding the initial display of the plaque.162  Recognizing 
the observer’s knowledge of why the plaque was displayed in the first 
place could make an enormous difference in Freethought.  Had the court 
framed the reasonable observer as knowing that the plaque was donated 
by a religious organization and erected following a religious dedication 
ceremony, the court could have likely concluded that a reasonable 
observer would view the initial erection of the plaque as a religious act 
and also view the County’s refusal to remove the plaque as religiously 
motivated.163  The court, however, did not engage in such analysis and 
reached the conclusion that display of the Ten Commandments plaque 
did not violate the Establishment Clause.164
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, however, decided in 
Glassroth v. Moore165 that a display of the Ten Commandments in a 
 159. Id.  The court noted that a reasonable person would perceive a decision to 
leave a Ten Commandments plaque that was erected many years ago in place as a desire 
to preserve a longstanding plaque.  Id.  In contrast, a reasonable person would perceive a 
current decision to erect a Ten Commandments plaque as more likely motivated by 
religious considerations.  Id. 
 160. Id. at 266. 
 161. In its conclusion that historical context suggests that the County was 
attempting to preserve a longstanding plaque rather than endorse religion, the court noted 
that the County had not taken any action involving the plaque since it was first erected 
(there had not been ceremonies celebrating any anniversaries of the plaque, the plaque 
was not relocated when the old entrance was closed, etc.), but never referred to the fact 
that the plaque was donated by the Religious Education Council and was affixed to the 
Courthouse after a dedication ceremony presided over by a Protestant Minister.  Id. at 
251, 266. 
 162. It is a somewhat unfair analysis, therefore, for the court to rely on the 
reasonable observer’s knowledge of the County’s conduct following the erection of the 
plaque, but to then ignore the observer’s knowledge of why the plaque was initially 
displayed on the Courthouse. 
 163. This is just one possibility, however.  The court could still rely more heavily 
on the fact that the County has done nothing to draw attention to the plaque since its 
erection, arriving at the conclusion that the County is primarily motivated by its desire to 
preserve a historical plaque.  Even if the court were to still conclude the case this way, 
fairness dictates that the court consider the circumstances surrounding the initial 
placement of the plaque and the possible affect it could have on reasonable observers. 
 164. Freethought, 334 F.3d at 270. 
 165. 335 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1000 (2003). 
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courthouse rotunda was a violation of the Establishment Clause.166  The 
court, applying the Lemon test, found that the display of the Ten 
Commandments monument violated the Establishment Clause because 
the evidence showed that the primary purpose of the monument was to 
endorse or promote religion.167
The court, however, did not stop its analysis at this point.  In the 
interest of completeness, the court also reviewed whether or not the 
monument had the primary effect of advancing religion.168  After saying 
that it would review whether or not the monument had the primary effect 
of advancing religion, the court immediately stated, “[t]he effect prong 
asks whether . . . the practice under review in fact would convey a 
message of endorsement or disapproval to an informed, reasonable 
observer.”169  The formulation of this inquiry into the effect of the 
monument was important because the legislative intent behind erecting 
the display was so clear.170
 166. Id. at 1285, 1297.  In Glassroth, the Chief Justice of the Alabama Supreme 
Court erected a two-and-one-half ton monument of the Ten Commandments in the 
rotunda of the Alabama State Judicial Building.  Id. at 1284.  The Chief Justice installed 
the monument without first discussing the matter with any of the other eight justices of 
the Alabama Supreme Court and did not use any government funds with respect to the 
creation or installation of the monument.  Id. at 1285.  The monument weighed 5280 
pounds, was approximately three feet wide by three feet deep by four feet tall, and was 
located in such a position that people had to pass by the monument to gain access to the 
elevator, stairs, restrooms, and law library.  Id.  These specific facts are included 
because, again, “Establishment Clause challenges are not decided by bright-line rules, 
but on a case-by-case basis with the result turning on the specific facts.”  Id. at 1288 
(citing King v. Richmond County, 331 F.3d 1271, 1275–76 (11th Cir. 2003)). 
 167. Id. at 1297.  This is a unique case because the motive for displaying the 
monument was unequivocal and easy to ascertain.  The Chief Justice stated that he 
installed the monument “to remind all Alabama citizens of . . . his belief in the 
sovereignty of the Judeo-Christian God over both the state and the church.”  Id. at 1284.  
Furthermore, in a speech commemorating the installation of the monument, the Chief 
Justice explained that “this monument will serve to remind the appellate courts and 
judges . . . that in order to establish justice, we must invoke ‘the favor and guidance of 
Almighty God.’”  Id. at 1286. 
 168. Id. at 1297. 
 169. Id. (quoting King, 331 F.3d at 1279).  This is actually the second prong of the 
endorsement test, not the Lemon test.  See supra note 131 and accompanying text 
(discussing how the notion of endorsement has been largely absorbed into the second 
prong of the Lemon test). 
 170. Id. at 1287.  The Chief Justice was frank about why he installed the Ten 
Commandments monument.  During trial, he testified as follows: 
Q [W]as your purpose in putting the Ten Commandments monument in the 
Supreme Court rotunda to acknowledge GOD’s law and GOD’s sovereignty? 
A Yes. 
Q . . . Do you agree that the monument, the Ten Commandments monument, 




Application of the endorsement test in Freethought and the Lemon test 
in Glassroth, not the factual distinctions between the cases, led to the 
different results.  The explanation for this is that the legislative purpose 
prong can be virtually ignored when applying the endorsement test, but 
not when applying the Lemon test.171  The Third Circuit, utilizing the 
endorsement test, did not examine the original purpose behind displaying 
the plaque in Freethought, but the facts of the case suggest the existence 
of religious motivations.172  Thus, had the Third Circuit applied the 
Lemon test and seriously looked at Chester County’s purpose in erecting 
the plaque in the first place, it is not so clear that the display would have 
been deemed constitutional.173
The Eleventh Circuit did apply the Lemon test and therefore was 
required to inquire into the purpose behind the erection of the monument.174  
Accordingly, because the court found that Justice Moore’s installation of 
the monument was clearly intended to advance religion, the display was 
deemed unconstitutional.175  Had both Circuits employed the Lemon test, 
they likely would have come to the same conclusion with respect to the 
purpose prong and the cases would not be inconsistent.176
Some might argue, however, that the two cases would still reach 
different results because they are factually different.  For example, one 
reflects the sovereignty of GOD over the affairs of men? 
A Yes. 
Q And the monument is also intended to acknowledge GOD’s overruling 
power over the affairs of men, would that be correct? . . . 
A Yes. 
Q  . . . [W]hen you say “GOD” you mean GOD of the Holy Scripture? 
A Yes. 
Id. 
 171. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).  
Lemon’s purpose prong asks whether the government acted with the purpose of 
endorsing or disapproving of religion.  Id.  “The effect prong asks whether, irrespective 
of [the] government’s actual purpose, the practice under review in fact conveys a 
message of endorsement or disapproval.”  Id. (emphasis added).  The challenged practice 
will be deemed unconstitutional if there is an affirmative answer to either question.  Id. 
 172. See supra note 161 and accompanying text. 
 173. That the plaque was donated by a religious group and was installed after a 
dedication ceremony presided over by a minister are sufficient to raise a question as to 
whether or not Chester County possessed a valid secular purpose in displaying the Ten 
Commandments plaque. 
 174. “The Lemon test requires that the challenged practice have a valid secular 
purpose . . . .”  Glassroth, 335 F.3d at 1295. 
 175. Id. at 1296–97.  Chief Justice Moore stated that his purpose in installing the 
monument “was to acknowledge the law and sovereignty of the God of the Holy 
Scriptures. . . .”  Id. at 1296.  Further, Justice Moore “refused a request to give a famous 
speech equal position and prominence because, he said, placing ‘a speech of any man 
alongside the revealed law of God would tend to diminish the very purpose of the Ten 
Commandments monument.’”  Id. (quoting Glassroth v. Moore, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 
1297 (M.D. Ala. 2002)). 
 176. See supra note 173. 
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major factual distinction between Freethought and Glassroth is that, in 
Freethought, the county merely accepted the plaque to be displayed, but, 
in Glassroth, Justice Moore affirmatively acted to install the monument.177  
One might argue, however, that the actions of an entire county are more 
representative of government’s sentiment than are the acts of one 
individual.178  This is not true, however, when the individual acts on behalf 
of the government.179  Thus, this purported factual difference does not 
really exist. 
Factual distinctions, such as size, shape, and weight, do exist between 
the Ten Commandments plaque in Freethought and the Ten Commandments 
monument in Glassroth.  These differences, however, should not form 
the crux of Establishment Clause analysis.180  The factual circumstances 
 177. It is not necessarily the case, however, that mere acceptance of a religious 
display would not be seen as an endorsement of religion. 
 178. This might be especially true in Glassroth because even though Justice Moore 
acknowledged that he wanted the monument installed to advance religion, because he 
acted alone and campaigned as the “Ten Commandments” judge, the citizens may not 
have felt that the government was endorsing religion.  Glassroth, 335 F.3d at 1284–85.  
One could argue that although Justice Moore’s acts indicated that he endorsed religion, 
his acting alone and failure to spend government funds in installing the monument could 
insulate the government from appearing to endorse religion.  See Dustin Zander, 
Comment, Thou Shalt Not Post the Ten Commandments on the Courtroom Wall: Judge 
Roy Moore and the Constitution, 9 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 371, 382 (1999) (stating that 
Justice Moore can express his beliefs so long as he is not speaking for the government 
when he does so). 
 179. While people may agree that Justice Moore should be able to express his 
religious beliefs, they might also argue that he should not be able to express these beliefs 
when speaking or acting on behalf of the government.  This notion finds support in case 
law.  See N.C. Civil Liberties Union Legal Found. v. Constangy, 947 F.2d 1145, 1151 
(4th Cir. 1991) (stating that a judge opening his courtroom with a prayer is a violation of 
the Establishment Clause).  This is because: 
   When a judge sits on the bench, says “Let us pause for a moment of prayer,” 
and proceeds to recite a prayer in court, clearly the court is conveying a 
message of endorsement of religion.  “Such an endorsement is not consistent 
with the established principle that the government must pursue a course of 
complete neutrality toward religion.”  [Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 60 
(1985).]  Judge Constangy argues that the prayer he delivers is his personal 
prayer and thus it does not result in government endorsement of religion.  We 
find Judge Constangy’s argument wholly unpersuasive.  A judge wearing a 
robe and speaking from the bench is obviously engaging in official conduct. 
Id. 
 180. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 675–76 (1989) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that it is problematic to look at each 
individual item in a holiday display because this would only be useful “after [the] Court 
has decided a long series of holiday display cases, using little more than intuition and a 
tape measure”).  Justice Kennedy went on to say: “‘It would be appalling to conduct 
litigation under the Establishment Clause as if it were a trademark case, with experts 




of each display should only be relevant insofar as they indicate an 
infringement upon personal religious liberty as a result of government 
action on behalf of religion in general or a specific religious group in 
particular. 
III.  A MODIFIED COERCION TEST 
Because the Lemon and endorsement tests have been insufficient in 
resolving Establishment Clause cases in a consistent, reliable manner, 
the Supreme Court should adopt a more workable test.  There are several 
alternatives to the Lemon and endorsement tests.181  Despite these 
testifying about whether one display is really like another, and witnesses testifying 
they were offended—but would have been less so were the crèche five feet closer to the 
jumbo candy cane.’”  Id. (quoting Am. Jewish Cong. v. Chicago, 827 F.2d 120, 130 (7th 
Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting)). 
 181. The following is not an exhaustive list, but rather suggests a few alternative 
possibilities.  First, we could have a test that deems an act, display, or statute 
unconstitutional if it offends even one person.  This is impractical in today’s pluralistic 
society because it is likely that at least one person will find fault with or be offended by 
almost any act, display, or statute that may be in existence.  See Smith, supra note 39, at 
291.  Another potential problem with this test is that it would allow almost any practice 
to be deemed a violation of the Establishment Clause.  See, e.g., Neal R. Feigenson, 
Political Standing and Governmental Endorsement of Religion: An Alternative to 
Current Establishment Clause Doctrine, 40 DEPAUL L. REV. 53, 109 (1990) (suggesting 
that a person might complain that the National Gallery of Art, a federally funded and 
managed institution, promotes religion when it displays “works of art featuring Madonnas 
and other sectarian subjects” because the presence of these images indicates that 
“Christianity plays a more important part in the national heritage than do other religions 
or sects”); see also, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Equal Access and Moments of Silence: The 
Equal Status of Religious Speech by Private Speakers, 81 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 8 & nn.38–39 
(1986) (arguing that “[a] little bit of government support for religion may only be a little 
bit of establishment, but it is still an establishment”).  Laycock contends: 
The government should not . . . name a city or a naval vessel for the Body of 
Christ [Corpus Christi, the name of a major city in Texas, is a Latin phrase 
meaning “Body of Christ”] or the Queen of Angels [The original Spanish name 
of Los Angeles was El Pueblo de Nuestra Señora la Reyna de los Angeles de 
Porciuncula—“The Town of Our Lady the Queen of the Angels of 
Porciuncula.” . . .  The name of the city has since been shortened to El Pueblo 
de la Reyna de los Angeles—“The Town of the Queen of Angels.”]  Either 
version names the city with an honorific title for Mary, a religious figure 
significant only to Christians. 
Id.  If religious art and names of cities could be held to be violations of the Establishment 
Clause, what practice would not be subject to being held unconstitutional under this test? 
A second possibility for an alternative test would be that an act, display, or statute is 
not a violation of the Establishment Clause unless it establishes a national religion.  
Under this formulation, almost no practice would violate the Establishment Clause.  This 
is a problem because Americans’ First Amendment rights could be infringed without the 
government going so far as to actually establish a national religion.  For example, a city 
might not officially declare an official religion, but the city might choose “to recognize, 
through religious displays, every significant Christian holiday while ignoring the holidays of 
all other faiths.”  Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 664 n.3 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part).  The First Amendment rights of non-Christians would be violated in 
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alternatives, the original intent of the Framers and the history of the 
United States indicate that a modified coercion test is the most 
appropriate for deciding Establishment Clause cases.182
this instance because it would be difficult for the city to maintain that it is not engaging 
in the “unmistakable and continual preference for one faith” over another that the First 
Amendment prohibits.  Id.  The First Amendment does not permit one religion to be 
favored over other religions, for religion to be favored over non-religion, or for non-religion 
to be favored over religion.  See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1947) 
(citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878)); see also Zorach v. Clauson, 
343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952) (stating that the Constitution does not require that the 
government show “callous indifference” to religion or religious groups). 
Another option would be to strictly apply the Lemon and endorsement tests.  See Loewy, 
supra note 71, at 1069–70 (advocating serious application of the endorsement test to all 
practices, including the Supreme Court’s invocation of “God save the United States and 
this Honorable Court” in opening its sessions and the phrase “under God” in the Pledge 
of Allegiance, as well as school prayer and holiday displays).  This would result in 
invalidation of the Court’s invocation and the current terminology of the Pledge.  These 
practical consequences of Loewy’s proposal closely resemble the practical consequences 
of the first alternative test proposed (that most things the government does relating to 
religion would violate the Establishment Clause).  This is unacceptable because it stifles 
appreciation for religious diversity and risks separating government and religion to such 
a degree that the government might be seen as being hostile toward religion.  
Government hostility toward religion, however, is not required by the First Amendment.  
See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 663–64 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (providing the example that “[i]f government is to participate in its citizens’ 
celebration of a holiday that contains both a secular and a religious component, enforced 
recognition of only the secular aspect would signify the callous indifference toward 
religious faith that our cases and traditions do not require”). 
As opposed to devising a new test to replace the Lemon and endorsement tests, another 
alternative might be to prevent the Supreme Court from deciding Establishment Clause 
cases at all.  The Constitution provides, 
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and 
those in which a State shall be a Party, the supreme Court shall have original 
Jurisdiction.  In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall 
have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and 
under such Regulations as the Congress shall make. 
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.  This provision seemingly supports the notion that 
Congress can take away the Supreme Court’s power to review Establishment Clause 
issues when those cases do not fall under the Court’s original jurisdiction.  See generally 
Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869) (holding that Congress has the power 
to make exceptions to the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction and, if Congress 
removes an aspect of the Court’s appellate jurisdiction, the Court no longer has 
jurisdiction over the case). 
 182. See Edwin Meese III, Interpreting the Constitution, in INTERPRETING THE 
CONSTITUTION 13, 17 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1990) (noting that original intent 
jurisprudence is not difficult to describe).  Meese states that the specific language of the 
Constitution must be obeyed, and that where “there is a demonstrable consensus among 
the framers and ratifiers as to a principle stated or implied by the Constitution, it 
should be followed as well.”  Id.  Finally, Meese notes that “[w]here there is 
ambiguity as to the precise meaning or reach of a constitutional provision, it should 




A.  Original Intent 
On June 8, 1789, James Madison proposed a series of amendments for 
House approval.183  The amendment regarding establishment of religion 
read: “The civil rights of none shall be abridged on account of religious 
belief or worship, nor shall any national religion be established, nor shall 
the full and equal rights of conscience be in any manner, or on any 
pretext, infringed.”184  This proposed amendment was given to a select 
committee of the House for consideration and was changed to: “[N]o 
religion shall be established by law, nor shall the equal rights of 
conscience be infringed.”185
Although the committee did not include any explanation for these 
changes, a condensed version of the debates illuminates some of the 
concerns surrounding the amendment.186  Commentary from some of the 
individuals present at the debates suggests that a primary motivating 
factor behind the amendment was the prevention of a national establishment 
of religion.187  The proposed amendment that the committee adopted 
be interpreted and applied in a manner so as to at least not contradict the text of the 
Constitution itself.”  Id.  But see LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE 
FRAMERS’ CONSTITUTION 322, 324 (1988) (“Acceptance of original intent as the 
foundation of constitutional interpretation is unrealistic beyond belief. . . .  A frozen 
or scleroteric Constitution would lose its character as a document intended to serve 
for ages to come.”).  Inquiry into original intent as a guidepost for how to proceed 
today, and slavish adherence to the thoughts and beliefs of individuals who lived 
two hundred years ago are, however, two completely different concepts.  This 
Comment does not advocate laboring over the precise ideas and circumstances that 
surrounded the Framers and then mindlessly applying what is discovered to current 
Establishment Clause cases.  Rather, this Comment supports examining the Framers’ 
original intent to act as one factor in shaping a framework that applies to society’s 
current situation without sacrificing historical context.  This position is reflective of 
Meese’s comment that “[t]he Constitution is not a legislative code bound to the time in 
which it was written.  Neither, however, is it a mirror that simply reflects the thoughts 
and ideas of those who stand before it.”  Meese, supra, at 15.  Ascertaining the original 
intent of the First Amendment does not contradict Part I of this Comment, where the 
legislative intent prong of the Lemon test is criticized.  This is because discerning the 
objective meaning or purpose of an amendment or a statute is a different task from 
determining subjective legislative intent.  See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 
636 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[W]hile it is possible to discern the objective 
‘purpose’ of a statute (i.e., the public good at which its provisions appear to be directed), 
or even the formal motivation for a statute where that is explicitly set forth . . . discerning 
the subjective motivation of those enacting the statute is, to be honest, almost always an 
impossible task.”). 
 183. LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT 94 (2d ed., rev. 1994). 
 184. Id. at 95. 
 185. Id. at 96. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. at 96–99.  For example: 
   Mr. Sylvester had some doubts of the propriety of the mode of expression 
used in this paragraph.  He apprehended that it was liable to a construction 
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read: “Congress shall make no laws touching religion, or infringing the 
rights of conscience,” but again, no reason was given for these changes.188  
Still another change occurred when the entire House voted on the 
proposed amendment clause by clause; “Fisher Ames of Massachusetts 
moved that the amendment read: ‘Congress shall make no law establishing 
religion, or to prevent the free exercise thereof, or to infringe the rights 
of conscience.’”189
The House adopted Ames’s motion, but made a stylistic change to the 
different from what had been made by the committee.  He feared it might be 
thought to have a tendency to abolish religion altogether. 
   . . . . 
   Mr. Gerry said it would read better if it was, that no religious doctrine shall 
be established by law. 
   Mr. Sherman thought the amendment altogether unnecessary, inasmuch as 
Congress had no authority whatever delegated to them by the constitution to 
make religious establishments . . . . 
   . . . . 
   Mr. Madison said, he apprehended the meaning of the words to be, that 
Congress should not establish a religion, and enforce the legal observation of it 
by law, nor compel men to worship God in any manner contrary to their 
conscience.  Whether the words are necessary or not, he did not mean to say, 
but they had been required by some of the State Conventions, who seemed to 
entertain an opinion that under the clause of the constitution, which gave 
power to Congress to make all laws necessary and proper to carry into 
execution the constitution, and the laws made under it, enabled them to make 
laws of such a nature as might infringe the rights of conscience, and establish a 
national religion; to prevent these effects he presumed the amendment was 
intended, and he thought it as well expressed as the nature of the language 
would admit. 
   . . . . 
   Mr. Madison thought, if the word national was inserted before religion, it 
would satisfy the minds of honorable gentlemen.  He believed that the people 
feared one sect might obtain a preeminence, or two combine together, and 
establish a religion to which they would compel others to conform.  He thought 
if the word national was introduced, it would point the amendment directly to 
the object it was intended to prevent. 
   . . . . 
   Mr. Gerry did not like the term national . . . .  [The] antifederalists at that 
time complained that they had injustice done them by the title, because they 
were in favor of a Federal Government, and the others were in favor of a 
national one . . . . 
   Mr. Madison withdrew his motion, but observed that the words “no national 
religion shall be established by law,” did not imply that the Government was a 
national one. 
Id. 
 188. Id. at 101. 
 189. Id. 




phraseology before submitting it to the Senate.190  The proposed amendment 
then read: “Congress shall make no law establishing religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof, nor shall the rights of conscience be 
infringed.”191
The Senate further changed the wording so that the amendment read: 
“Congress shall make no law establishing articles of faith or a mode of 
worship, or prohibiting the free exercise of religion.”192  The House rejected 
this proposal because it was not satisfied with a simple ban prohibiting 
the preference of one sect or religion over others.193  On September 24, 
1789, the House reported to the Senate that it would accept the Senate’s 
version of other amendments provided that the amendment on religion 
read: “Congress shall make no laws respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”194  The Senate accepted 
this condition on September 25, 1789, and Congress thus passed the 
Establishment Clause.195
One piece of information that can be gleaned from the progression of 
the wording of the Establishment Clause is that the House did not intend 
to draft an amendment that only prohibited Congress from supporting 
one sect, church, denomination, or religion.196  Nevertheless, some 
people advocate the position that the federal government may not favor 
one sect, church, denomination, or religion over another, but that the 
government may aid and support religion in general or all denominations 
without discrimination.197
 190. Id. at 101–02. 
 191. Id. at 102. 
 192. Id.  This language resulted after three motions of special interest were proposed 
and denied.  The first proposal would have had the text of the amendment read: “Congress 
shall make no law establishing one religious sect or society in preference to others.”  Id.  
The second motion would have the amendment read: “Congress shall not make any law 
infringing the rights of conscience, or establishing any religious sect or society.”  Id.  The 
final motion would have changed the language of the amendment to: “Congress shall 
make no law establishing any particular denomination of religion in preference to 
another.”  Id. 
 193. Id. at 103–04. 
 194. Id. at 104. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id.  In other words, the House was not only concerned with preventing a 
nationwide preference for one religious denomination over others. 
 197. Id. at 105.  However, Levy argues that such a reading is impermissible because 
this position leads to 
the impossible conclusion that the First Amendment added to Congress’s 
power.  Nothing supports such a conclusion.  Every bit of evidence goes to 
prove that the First Amendment, like the others, was intended to restrict 
Congress to its enumerated powers.  Because Congress possessed no power 
under the Constitution to legislate on matters concerning religion, Congress 
has no such power even in the absence of the First Amendment. 
Id. 
KAHLE 4/7/2005  10:28 AM 
[VOL. 42:  349, 2005]  Making “Lemon-Aid” 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 391 
 
The Supreme Court, however, has not accepted this argument.198  The 
Court has viewed the Establishment Clause as erecting a “wall of 
separation” between church and state, as well as protecting individuals’ 
freedom of conscience in religious worship.199  Therefore, it can be said 
that the Establishment Clause guarantees more protection than simply 
preventing the government from establishing a national religion or 
preferring one religious group over another.200  But, how far does the 
 198. See generally Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
 199. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878).  When the 
Constitution was being drafted, Thomas Jefferson was not in attendance.  Id. at 163.  
Yet, when he saw a draft of the document, he was disappointed that it did not contain a 
provision ensuring the freedom of religion.  Id.  Several states proposed amendments 
regarding religious freedom and would not ratify the Constitution until these 
amendments were considered.  Id. at 164.  Accordingly, James Madison proposed a 
religious freedom amendment that was adopted because it addressed the concerns of the 
advocates of religious freedom.  Id.  Thomas Jefferson spoke to the Danbury Baptist 
Association regarding the amendment and stated: 
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between man and 
his God; that he owes account to none other for his faith or his worship; that 
the legislative powers of the government reach actions only, and not 
opinions,—I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole 
American people which declared that their legislature should “make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof,” thus building a wall of separation between church and State.  
Adhering to this expression of the supreme will of the nation in behalf of the 
rights of conscience, I shall see with sincere satisfaction the progress of those 
sentiments which tend to restore man to all his natural rights, convinced he has 
no natural right in opposition to his social duties. 
Id.  The Court went on to say that this statement could be accepted “almost as an 
authoritative declaration of the scope and effect of the amendment” because it was made 
by an acknowledged leader of the advocates of the amendment.  Id.  Further, the Court, 
in Davis v. Beason stated that “religion” refers to one’s perception of his relationship to 
his Creator.  133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890).  The Court also stated that although “religion” is 
often confused with “the cultus or form of worship of a particular sect,” it is in fact 
distinguishable from a particular form of worship.  Id.  The use of “religion” in the First 
Amendment, according to the Court, was intended to allow each person to define his or 
her relationship with his or her Maker and to demonstrate this worship as he or she 
deemed appropriate.  Id.  Finally, the First Amendment’s use of “religion” was intended 
to “prohibit legislation for the support of any religious tenets, or the modes of worship of 
any sect.”  Id. 
 200. See LEVY, supra note 182, at 174.  “An uncontested and incontestable fact that 
stands out from the establishment clause is that the United States cannot constitutionally 
enact any law preferring one church over others in any way whatever.”  Id.; see also 
Philip B. Kurland, The Origins of the Religion Clauses of the Constitution, 27 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 839, 860 (1986) (“The intended direction of the first amendment was the 
enhancement of individual freedom. . . .  [T]he objectives were to establish an equality 
among persons, so that each individual could choose without interference how to 
commune with his god, and to avoid the havoc that religious conflicts had imposed on 




protection of the Establishment Clause extend, considering that the 
legislative history of the First Amendment does not indicate what the 
Framers meant by “an establishment of religion?”201  Because there is no 
clear answer to this question, it is best to view the protections of the 
Establishment Clause in terms of what it was meant to accomplish, 
rather than attempting to draw bright lines regarding its scope. 
B.  Historical Tradition 
Because the Framers’ original intent only indicates that, at a 
minimum, the federal government may not establish a national religion 
or favor one religious group over another, examining the history of the 
United States is also useful in determining what the Establishment 
Clause was designed to achieve.  Many of the early settlers of America 
left Europe to escape laws that compelled them to support and attend 
government-favored churches.202  Nevertheless, these practices continued in 
America because the English Crown granted charters authorizing 
individuals and companies to build religious establishments.203  The 
charters further provided that all people, whether religious believers or 
not, would be required to support and attend the established churches.204  
This resulted in the persecution of those who were in the religious 
minority and the requirement that religious minorities pay tithes and taxes 
to support government-sponsored churches.205  In response, the Virginia 
Assembly enacted the Virginia Bill for Religious Liberty, which promoted 
mankind throughout history.”). 
 201. LEVY, supra note 183, at 105; see Michael W. McConnell, Coercion: The Lost 
Element of Establishment, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 933, 936–37 (1986) (arguing that in 
examining Madison’s comments to the First Congress regarding his proposals for the 
religion amendment, “compulsion is not just an element, it is the essence of an 
establishment”).  With respect to what the Framers meant by “an establishment of religion,” 
see Douglas G. Smith, The Establishment Clause: Corollary of Eighteenth-Century 
Corporate Law?, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 239, 240 (2003) (suggesting that the Framers 
“understood the term ‘establishment’ in a very technical sense”).  Smith asserts, 
“‘Establishing’ a religion was essentially equivalent to granting a special corporate 
charter to a particular religious denomination. . . .  Accordingly, in prohibiting Congress 
from issuing any laws respecting an ‘establishment’ of religion, the founders sought to 
prohibit the federal government from passing laws relating to such corporate charters.”  
Id. at 240.  States, not the federal government, could grant these corporate charters, so 
the Establishment Clause functioned to define the roles of federal and state governments 
with respect to religious establishments.  Id.  As such, the clause made clear that the 
federal government could not grant corporate charters, and therefore could not establish 
a national religion.  “Thus, the clause embodied the more general belief of the time that 
the federal government lacked authority in matters pertaining to corporations, whether 
secular or ecclesiastical.”  Id. at 241. 
 202. Everson, 330 U.S. at 8. 
 203. Id. at 9. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. at 10. 
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Despite the problems associated with the union of government and 
religion, our government has historically recognized the role that religion 
plays in the lives of its citizens in a number of ways.207  Even the Supreme 
Court itself has recognized that “[w]e are a religious people whose 
institutions presuppose a Supreme Being.”208  Accordingly, the government 
respects differences in religious belief and allows all of its citizens to 
express the different beliefs and creeds that they hold.209  This governmental 
recognition of religion seems inconsistent with modern establishment 
clause theories that advocate complete separation of government and 
religion.  However, governmental recognition of religion is consistent 
with Establishment Clause jurisprudence if one acknowledges that the 
Establishment Clause was directed at prohibiting religious coercion.210
 206. Id. at 12.  The bill stated, “no man shall be compelled to frequent or support 
any religious worship, place, or ministry whatsoever, nor shall be enforced, restrained, 
molested, or burthened [sic] in his body or goods, nor shall otherwise suffer on account 
of his religious opinions or belief.”  Id. at 13. 
 207. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 675–77 (1984).  The Court noted: 
    Our history is replete with official references to the value and invocation of 
Divine guidance in deliberations and pronouncements of the Founding Fathers 
and contemporary leaders.  Beginning in the early colonial period long before 
Independence, a day of Thanksgiving was celebrated as a religious holiday to 
give thanks for the bounties of Nature as gifts from God. 
    . . . . 
    Other examples of reference to our religious heritage are found in the 
statutorily prescribed national motto “In God We trust,” which Congress and 
the President mandated for our currency . . . . 
 Art galleries supported by public revenues display religious paintings of the 
15th and 16th centuries, predominantly inspired by one religious faith. 
    . . . [Finally,] Congress has directed the President to proclaim a National 
Day of Prayer each year. 
Id. 
 208. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952). 
 209. See Kurland, supra note 200, at 860 (“If there is any fixed star in our 
constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall 
be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to 
confess by word or act their faith therein.”) (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 
319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)). 
 210. McConnell, supra note 201, at 939.  McConnell notes: 
In the debates in the First Congress concerning the wording of the first 
amendment, James Madison, the principal draftsman and proponent, said of 
the committee draft that he “apprehended the meaning of the words to be, that 
Congress should not establish a religion, and enforce the legal observation of it 
by law, nor compel men to worship God in any manner contrary to their 
conscience.”  Upon further questioning by those who feared that the proposed 
amendment “might be taken in such latitude as to be extremely hurtful to the 




C.  Formulation of the Modified Coercion Test 
The original formulation of the coercion test is not the proper test for 
Establishment Clause issues because it is difficult to apply.  The Court’s 
coercion analysis in Lee v. Weisman211 has been interpreted as finding a 
practice unconstitutional when “(1) the government directs (2) a formal 
religious exercise (3) in such a way as to oblige the participation of 
objectors.”212  Under this formulation, it is not easy to define what 
constitutes a “formal religious exercise.”213  Further, to find that the 
Establishment Clause has been violated, these criteria are sufficient, but 
not necessary.214
A modified coercion test is therefore a better alternative to applying 
the original formulation of the coercion test for two reasons.  First, it 
takes into account Framers’ intent that not only should the government 
be prohibited from establishing a national religion, but also that freedom 
of conscience regarding religion should be closely guarded.215  Second, it 
also recognizes that historical practice in the United States demonstrates 
that religion is an important part of society.216  In this regard, the proper 
test should hold that violation of the First Amendment occurs when the 
government consistently exposes observers to an obtrusive religious 
cause of religion,” Madison clarified the point.  He stated that he “believed that 
the people feared one sect might obtain a pre-eminence, or two combine 
together, and establish a religion to which they would compel others to 
conform.”  Is compulsion an element of an establishment clause violation?  If 
Madison’s explanations to the First Congress are any guide, compulsion is not 
just an element, it is the essence of an establishment. 
Id. at 936–37 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). 
 211. 505 U.S. 577 (1992). 
 212. Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963, 970 (5th Cir. 1992). 
 213. “Formal religious exercise” connotes an event, such as the invocation of prayer 
or the performance of a religious service.  Yet, the government could risk establishing a 
national religion or infringing upon individuals’ freedom of conscience regarding 
religion without directing such a “formal religious exercise.” 
 214. That is, while the Establishment Clause is violated when these elements exist, 
violations can still occur in the absence of these requirements. 
 215. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 12–13 (1947).  The Preamble to the 
Virginia Bill for Religious Liberty stated: 
   Almighty God hath created the mind free; that all attempts to influence it by 
temporal punishments or burthens [sic], or by civil incapacitations, tend only 
to beget habits of hypocrisy and meanness, and are a departure from the plan 
of the Holy author of our religion, who being Lord both of body and mind, yet 
chose not to propagate it by coercions on either . . . ; that to compel a man to 
furnish contributions of money for the propagation of opinions which he 
disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical; that even the forcing him to support this or 
that teacher of his own religious persuasion, is depriving him of the 
comfortable liberty of giving his contributions to the particular pastor, whose 
morals he would make his pattern. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 216. See supra note 207. 
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symbol.  There are three elements that can be distilled from this test: 
there must be government action, an obtrusive religious symbol, and 
consistent exposure to the religious symbol.217
For a violation to occur, the government must be acting.  This is because 
the First Amendment prohibits Congress, not private citizens, from 
making laws respecting an establishment of religion.218  Government 
action exists when a government entity or representative is the catalyst 
that brings a particular statute, regulation, or display into existence.219
There must also be an obtrusive religious symbol to which observers 
are consistently exposed for the Establishment Clause to be violated.220  
This is because the presence of a prominent religious symbol displayed 
continually throughout the year indicates that the government is proselytizing 
on behalf of religion generally or one religion in particular.221  
 217. For purposes of this proposed test, “symbol” is applied expansively, including 
both physical objects and words, for increased application of this test to various 
Establishment Clause cases.  Nevertheless, despite the desire to be able to apply the test 
to as many Establishment Clause scenarios as possible, certain cases will likely arise 
wherein application of this test might be ill-suited. 
 218. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 219. Thus, private action will not be sufficient to violate the Establishment Clause.  
See, e.g., Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 770 (1995) 
(holding that the Capitol Square Review Board’s act of permitting the Ku Klux Klan to 
erect a cross on the statehouse plaza during the Christmas season did not violate the 
Establishment Clause because “[r]eligious expression cannot violate the Establishment 
Clause where it (1) is purely private and (2) occurs in a traditional or designated public 
forum, publicly announced and open to all on equal terms”). 
 220. “Obtrusive” is meant to get at the notion of the prominence of the religious 
symbol in any display or practice and is therefore defined as follows: “Characterized by 
forcibly thrusting (oneself, one’s opinions, etc.) into notice or prominence.”  10 OXFORD 
ENGLISH DICTIONARY 671 (J.A. Simpson & E.S.C. Weiner eds., 2d ed. 1989).  
Accordingly, size and placement of the symbol will be relevant factors, but not the 
primary focus, so as to avoid the problem of the Court deciding cases with “little more 
than intuition and a tape measure.”  County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 675 
(1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 221. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 661 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part).  Justice Kennedy noted that symbolic recognition of religious faith could violate 
the Establishment Clause.  As an example, Justice Kennedy stated that the Establishment 
Clause would prohibit a city from permanently erecting a large Latin cross on the roof of 
city hall.  Id.  Justice Kennedy said that this is the case “not because government speech 
about religion is per se suspect, as the majority would have it, but because such an 
obtrusive year-round religious display would place the government’s weight behind an 
obvious effort to proselytize on behalf of a particular religion.”  Id.; see also Friedman v. 
Bd. of County Comm’rs, 781 F.2d 777, 781 (10th Cir. 1985) (stating that a county seal 
containing a Latin cross and the phrase “With This We Conquer” might not always 
violate the Establishment Clause).  The court noted that some uses of the seal might not 
indicate an impermissible union of church and state.  Id.  For example, the court said that 




“Proselytizing” suggests that the government is improperly running the 
risk of establishing a national religion or curbing individual freedom in 
religious matters.222
This modified coercion test is, therefore, consistent with the principles 
underlying the First Amendment: that the government may not establish 
a national religion, and that individuals’ freedom of conscience must be 
respected.223  This test is also proper because it acknowledges that 
passive acknowledgment of religion, without coercion, does not pose a 
great risk of establishing religion or infringing upon religious liberty.224  
Finally, the test is useful because it focuses on the actor, the action  
taking place, and the result of this action. 
The use of a coercion test to resolve Establishment Clause cases has, 
however, been criticized.  One criticism is that coercion tests require “a 
de minimis threshold of impermissible religious content.  If there is not a 
sufficiently religious component to the message, then the . . . test does 
not apply; the difficulty is in defining de minimis . . . .”225  The proposed 
using the seal as a notary seal or only depicting the seal in one color (where it is difficult 
to detect the cross) might not violate the Establishment Clause.  Id.  The seal at issue in 
Friedman, however, was distinguished from the crèche in Lynch and deemed 
unconstitutional because it 
pervade[d] the daily lives of county residents.  It [wa]s not displayed once a 
year for a brief period on a single parcel of government land.  Rather it 
appear[ed] on all county paper work, on all county vehicles, even on county 
sheriff’s uniforms.  Further, Bernalillo County residents d[id] not view the 
cross and motto in the context of a generally secular commercial display, as 
Pawtucket, Rhode Island, residents d[id] the crèche.  The context of the cross 
and motto [wa]s quite different.  The cross [wa]s the only visual element on 
the seal that [wa]s surrounded by rays of light.  The motto may be fairly 
regarded as promoting the religion the cross represents.  Indeed, that religion 
seems to be embraced as the instrument by which the county “conquers.” 
Id. at 782. 
 222. See 12 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 664 (J.A. Simpson & E.S.C. Weiner 
eds., 2d ed. 1989) (defining “proselyte” as follows: “[T]o cause to come over or turn 
from one opinion, belief, creed, or party to another; esp. to convert from one religious 
faith or sect to another”).  Government proselytization undermines the principles 
embodied by the First Amendment insofar as government action that attempts to cause 
individuals to modify their religious beliefs does not respect freedom of conscience 
regarding religion. 
 223. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).  Justice 
Jackson stated, “[i]f there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no 
official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, 
religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith 
therein.”  Id.; see also County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 660 (1989) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that “[t]he freedom to 
worship as one pleases without government interference or oppression is the great object 
of . . . the Establishment [Clause]”). 
 224. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 662 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 225. Matthew A. Peterson, Note, The Supreme Court’s Coercion Test: Insufficient 
Constitutional Protection for America’s Religious Minorities, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 245, 255 (2001). 
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modified coercion test avoids this problem by defining what constitutes 
improper government action more clearly than did previous formulations 
of the coercion test.226  Another criticism is that coercion standards allow 
the government to engage in religious approval or disapproval, so long 
as dissenters are free to ignore the approval or disapproval.227  The 
modified coercion test, however, does not require that an act, statute, or 
display be deemed constitutional so long as objectors are free to ignore 
the religious content.228  In this regard, the modified coercion test seeks 
to be sensitive to religious minorities and to strike a balance between 
promoting religious diversity and restricting government action to the 
confines of the First Amendment. 
IV.  APPLICATION OF THE MODIFIED COERCION TEST 
The benefits of the modified coercion test can best be seen in applying 
it to the facts of actual cases.  The holiday display, Ten Commandments, 
and Pledge of Allegiance cases previously analyzed under the Lemon 
and endorsement tests also provide good opportunities for examining the 
implications of the modified coercion test. 
Applying the modified coercion test to the facts of Lynch would result 
in the display of the crèche being deemed constitutional because observers 
were not consistently exposed to an obtrusive religious symbol.  Although 
the government was arguably acting in Lynch, as it undertook the task of 
displaying the crèche on its own and paying for the set-up and take-
down costs each year,229 whether or not display of the crèche constitutes 
an obtrusive religious symbol is unclear from the facts of Lynch.230  
Nevertheless, to properly consider the concerns of religious minorities, 
we can assume that the crèche was in fact an obtrusive religious symbol.  
Despite these facts, the crèche was only displayed in the limited context 
 226. See supra note 213 discussing the difficulties with defining the “formal 
religious exercise” requirement of the coercion test formulated in Lee. 
 227. Peterson, supra note 225, at 256. 
 228. See infra pp. 400–01 for further discussion as to how the display of a Ten 
Commandments monument violates the Establishment Clause despite the fact that 
observers are free to ignore the display. 
 229. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 671 (1984). 
 230. See supra note 94.  The facts of the case state that figures of Jesus, Mary, and 
Joseph were included in the display together with secular symbols of Christmas such as 
Santa Claus, reindeer, and candy canes.  These facts do not indicate the prominence of 
the religious symbols in relation to the secular ones.  Therefore, it is difficult to say with 
certainty whether or not the crèche was an obtrusive religious symbol. 




of the holiday season.  Therefore, display of the crèche does not satisfy 
all elements of the modified coercion test and should be deemed a 
constitutional display. 
It is undoubted that one principal objection to this analysis is that 
when the government acts to display an obtrusive religious symbol, the 
display should be deemed unconstitutional whether it is permanent or 
not.231  Under an endorsement analysis, this objection might prove fatal 
to the assertion that, to be unconstitutional, the government action 
should be permanent instead of temporary.  This is because, under an 
endorsement approach, any appearance of governmental alliance with 
religion is viewed as inappropriate.  This is not the case under a coercion 
analysis.  The primary concerns of the modified coercion test, the prevention 
of an establishment of a national religion and the protection of individual 
religious liberty, are kept intact unless the government acts to repeatedly 
proselytize on behalf of religion. 
Display of the religious symbols in Allegheny would also be 
constitutional under the modified coercion test.  It is debatable as to 
whether the government was acting in Allegheny because, unlike Lynch 
where the city itself owned the display, in this case a Roman Catholic 
group owned the crèche and a Jewish group owned the menorah.232  In 
this regard, the government was not undertaking the task of exhibiting 
the displays strictly of its own accord.  To be deferential to religious 
minorities, however, it will be assumed that the government acted by 
displaying the religious symbols in Allegheny.233  It will also be assumed 
that both displays contained obtrusive religious symbols because the 
crèche display did not contain any secular symbols, and the Court’s 
analysis of the secular nature of the menorah display contained logical 
flaws.234  Even if one were to assume that the government was acting 
 231. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 608 n.56 (1989) (noting that 
“[i]n describing what would violate his ‘proselytization’ test, Justice Kennedy uses the 
adjectives ‘permanent,’ ‘year-round,’ and ‘continual,’ as if to suggest that temporary acts 
of favoritism for a particular sect do not violate the Establishment Clause”) (citation 
omitted). 
 232. See supra note 112. 
 233. See infra note 237 and accompanying text. 
 234. See supra notes 133–44 and accompanying text.  The fact that the presence of 
secular symbols was not as strong in Allegheny as it was in Lynch does not mean to 
suggest that holiday displays must contain symbols of every religious holiday and 
common secular symbols, such as Santa Clauses and candy canes, to be constitutional.  
In fact, some scholars have named this very notion the “three plastic animals rule.”  See, e.g., 
Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 
126–27 (1992).  McConnell notes: 
[A] plurality of the Court permitted the menorah in County of Allegheny v ACLU 
because it was next to a forty-five-foot tall Christmas tree, and a majority 
permitted the nativity scene in Lynch v Donnelly because it was surrounded by 
a Santa Claus house, reindeer, candy-striped poles, a Christmas tree, carolers, 
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and that the displays contained obtrusive religious symbols, the crèche 
and menorah displays would be deemed constitutional under the 
modified coercion test because they too were displayed in the limited 
context of the holiday season.235
Applying the modified coercion test to the facts of Freethought, the 
display of the Ten Commandments plaque would be found constitutional.  
Whether or not there was government action in this case is questionable.  
The county did not initiate the display of the Ten Commandments plaque 
on its own, but rather displayed it after receiving it from a religious 
group.236  It could be argued that accepting a religious display is as though 
the government itself were acting because the government’s act of 
accepting the display indicates its support and approval of the religious 
ideals embodied within the display.  To be considerate to religious 
minorities, it will be assumed for purposes of this hypothetical that mere 
governmental acceptance of a religious display will meet the necessary 
governmental action required under the modified coercion test.237  Even if it 
is assumed that the government affirmatively acted in displaying the plaque, 
however, the plaque still does not violate the Establishment Clause. 
cut-out figures representing such characters as a clown, an elephant, and a 
teddy bear, hundreds of colored lights, a banner stating “Season’s Greetings,” 
and a talking wishing well.  In contrast, the Court held unconstitutional the 
nativity scene in Allegheny, which was tastefully displayed with a backdrop of 
greenery and poinsettias, but unaccompanied by secular signs of the season.  
Practitioners have dubbed the holdings in Lynch and Allegheny “the three-
plastic animals rule.” 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 235. See supra note 231 and accompanying text. 
 236. See supra note 150. 
 237. The assumption that governmental acceptance of a display is the equivalent of 
governmental action to create a display is used for this hypothetical but is not necessarily 
true for real-life applications.  That is, it is not clear that mere governmental acceptance 
should be treated the same way that governmental action is treated.  Although the county 
accepted the plaque from a religious organization and placed it at the entrance to the 
courthouse, this is not the type of action directed by the government in Lynch, where the 
city owned the religious object and erected and dismantled the display each year.  
Freethought Soc’y v. Chester County, 334 F.3d 247, 249–50 (3d Cir. 2003).  The county 
accepted the plaque and placed it at the entrance to the courthouse, but left the plaque in 
that location without drawing attention to, maintaining, or celebrating it.  Yet, some 
might argue that the county’s act of accepting the plaque for display at all constitutes 
sufficient government action to meet the first prong of the proposed coercion test.  More 
facts of the case must be known before this argument can be proven true.  If the county 
refused to accept plaques from other organizations, religious or nonreligious, or accepted 
all plaques but only displayed the plaque of the Ten Commandments, this argument may 
be well-founded.  However, the act of accepting, in and of itself cannot necessarily be 
deemed the acceptor’s endorsement of the object accepted. 




The plaque in Freethought does not violate the Establishment Clause 
because it is not an obtrusive religious symbol.  Although the plaque is 
certainly a religious symbol as it contains the text of the Ten Commandments, 
it is not obtrusive because it is one plaque displayed among many.238  
This is not to say that a religious monument must be surrounded by 
secular signs and plaques to be constitutional or that all religious monuments 
that are surrounded by secular plaques are constitutional.239  Under the 
facts of this case, however, the Ten Commandments plaque was not 
prominent or obtrusive in light of the facts that there were secular/ministerial 
plaques surrounding it and that the county never did anything to draw 
attention to or celebrate the plaque.240  Because the plaque is not an 
obtrusive symbol, the requirements of the modified coercion test are not 
met and the plaque does not violate the Establishment Clause.241
Applying the modified coercion test to the facts of Glassroth would 
result in the display of the Ten Commandments monument being held 
unconstitutional.  It can be said that the government acted to install the 
monument, as Chief Justice Moore was acting in his official capacity as 
a government official when he erected the monument.242  Secondly, the 
monument was obtrusive as it was prominently placed in the center of 
 238. The Ten Commandments plaque was fifty inches tall and thirty-nine inches 
wide, surrounded by other plaques, such as a no-smoking sign that was twenty-four 
inches tall and seventeen inches wide, three plaques regarding courthouse hours that 
were fifty-three inches tall and twenty-six inches wide altogether, a small plaque stating 
that the courthouse had been placed on the National Register of Historic Places, and a 
no-skateboarding sign that was twenty-four inches tall and seventeen inches wide.  Id. at 
253–54. 
 239. The circumstances surrounding any given plaque are relevant in determining 
the plaque’s overall prominence in the display.  Thus, it is not the absolute size of the 
religious plaque that is relevant (i.e., it is not the case that all plaques smaller than five-feet 
by five-feet are constitutional, whereas all displays larger than these dimensions are 
unconstitutional), but rather the factual surroundings of the display as a whole.  See 
supra notes 220–21 and accompanying text. 
 240. In fact, when the entrance to the courthouse was moved in 2001, the Ten 
Commandments plaque was not relocated to the new entrance.  Freethought, 334 F.3d at 
253. 
 241. This is the case even if display of the plaque is consistent, since all elements 
must be met for an Establishment Clause violation to occur.  Nevertheless, whether or 
not display of the plaque is consistent is questionable.  The plaque was consistently 
displayed for eighty years above the entrance, but the plaque was not relocated to the 
new entrance in 2001.  Id. at 253–54.  Observers are not consistently exposed to this 
religious plaque currently, as they would have to go out of their way to proceed to the 
old entrance to view the plaque.  Id. 
 242. Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282, 1285 (11th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 
U.S. 1000 (2003).  Justice Moore, as Chief Justice, has final authority over the 
decoration of the rotunda and whether to put any displays in the building.  Id.  Further, 
after Justice Moore was elected Chief Justice, he fulfilled his campaign promise to 
“restore the moral foundation of law” by installing the Ten Commandments monument.  
Id. 
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the courthouse rotunda.243  Another indication of the monument’s 
prominence is the fact that Justice Moore rejected a request to display a 
historically significant speech in the same area.244  Unlike the plaque in 
Freethought that was displayed among many other plaques, the 
monument here was displayed by itself in the center of the courthouse 
rotunda, while requests for other texts to be displayed were rejected.245
The monument in Glassroth was the product of government action, was 
obtrusive, and observers were consistently exposed to it.  Observers were 
subjected to consistent exposure to the display because the monument 
was a permanent display within the courthouse, as opposed to being 
displayed during a limited season like the displays in both Lynch and 
Allegheny.  These facts indicate that the government was acting to elevate 
religion’s status above secular status.  Therefore, application of the modified 
coercion test would find the display to violate the Establishment Clause. 
Finally, application of the proposed modified coercion test to Newdow 
v. United States Congress, the Pledge of Allegiance case, would result in 
deeming the phrase “under God” unconstitutional.  First, the Pledge 
itself is the product of government action as the government created the 
Pledge and added the phrase “under God” to it in 1954.246  More 
 243. Id. at 1284.  The monument was displayed in the center of the rotunda so that 
“[n]o one who enter[ed] the building through the main entrance [could] miss the 
monument.”  Id. at 1285. 
 244. Id. at 1284. 
 245. The plaques in Freethought were all similar in size, and both religious and 
secular plaques were displayed alongside one another above an old entrance to the 
courthouse.  Freethought, 334 F.3d at 254.  This is a stark contrast from one large 
religious monument (here the monument weighed 5280 pounds and was three feet wide 
by three feet deep by four feet tall) displayed by itself in the center of the courthouse 
rotunda.  Glassroth, 335 F.3d at 1285. 
 246. Loewy, supra note 71, at 1070; see also Brief Amici Curiae of Christian Legal 
Society et al. at 5–6, Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 1191 (2004) 
(No. 02-1624) (discussing the addition of the phrase “under God” to the Pledge).  The 
Christian Legal Society noted that, by adding the phrase “under God” to the Pledge, 
Congress wished to emphasize a distinction between the United States and Russia: that 
the United States was a theistic nation but that Russia was not.  The brief states that the 
conference report makes this distinction clear. 
   At this moment of our history the principles underlying our American 
Government and the American way of life are under attack by a system whose 
philosophy is at direct odds with our own.  Our American Government is 
founded on the concept of the individuality and the dignity of the human being.  
Underlying this concept is the belief that the human person is important 
because he was created by God and endowed by Him with certain inalienable 
rights which no civil authority may usurp.  The inclusion of God in our pledge 
therefore would further acknowledge the dependence of our people and our 




specifically, the facts of Newdow indicate that the government acted by 
virtue of a school district policy that mandates that teachers lead willing 
students in reciting the Pledge each morning.247  Because the school district 
policy requires that the Pledge be recited each morning, students are 
consistently exposed to it.248  Requiring students to attend school and 
then requiring the recitation of the Pledge each morning puts objectors in 
“the dilemma of participating, with all that implies, or protesting.”249  
This is precisely the type of infringement upon freedom of conscience 
with respect to religious liberty that the Establishment Clause was designed 
to prohibit. 
The only issue that remains, therefore, is whether or not the words 
“under God” constitute an obtrusive religious symbol.  Because “symbol” 
under the proposed modified coercion test is defined expansively to 
include both objects and words, the phrase “under God” itself can be 
considered a religious symbol.  This is because the phrase represents the 
notion of a Christian God who created humans and a God upon whom 
humans depend for rights and moral direction.250  This phrase, furthermore, 
is an obtrusive religious symbol because it improperly ties citizens’ 
patriotism as Americans to an expressed belief in God.251  By including the 
phrase “under God” in the Pledge, the government effectively communicates 
Government upon the moral directions of the Creator.  At the same time it 
would serve to deny the atheistic and materialistic concepts of communism 
with its attendant subservience of the individual. 
Id. 
 247. Newdow v. United States Cong., 328 F.3d 466, 482–83 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. 
granted in part, Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 540 U.S. 945 (2003), rev’d, 
124 S. Ct. 2301 (2004), reh’g denied, 125 S. Ct. 21 (2004).  Elk Grove Unified School 
District requires that teachers lead their students in reciting the Pledge at the beginning 
of each school day.  Id. at 482.  This policy stems from the fact that the California 
Education Code mandates that public school days begin with “appropriate patriotic 
exercises.”  Id.  The Education Code also states that recitation of the Pledge qualifies as 
an appropriate patriotic exercise.  Id.  Accordingly, Elk Grove Unified School District 
“has promulgated a policy that states, in pertinent part: ‘Each elementary school class 
[shall] recite the pledge of allegiance to the flag once each day.’”  Id. at 483. 
 248. One response to this assertion is that, in actuality, only those children who 
wish to be exposed to the Pledge in fact encounter its content on a regular basis because 
those students who object to reciting the Pledge are not required to participate.  See W. Va. 
State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641–42 (1943) (holding that public school 
students cannot be required to recite the Pledge).  This is not a valid objection because 
children can only avoid the content of and consistent exposure to the Pledge by 
choosing, each and every day of the school year, to refrain from reciting it. 
 249. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 593 (1992). 
 250. See supra note 246. 
 251. See Brief of Amicus Curiae American Atheists at 21–23, Elk Grove Unified 
Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 1191 (2004) (No. 02-1624).  The brief discusses why 
addition of the phrase “under God” is an unnecessary part of an otherwise patriotic 
exercise.  Specifically, the brief refutes the notion that the phrase is needed to solemnify 
public occasions and express hope in the future (as Justice O’Connor suggested that 
these words function in her concurring opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly). 
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to Americans that they must profess a belief in God to be patriotic 
American citizens.  This certainly crosses the line that the government, 
under the First Amendment, is prohibited from curbing individuals’ 
freedom of conscience with respect to religious matters.  Thus, including 
the words “under God” in the Pledge violates the Establishment Clause 
under the proposed modified coercion test. 
The modified coercion test is by no means perfect and will likely be 
met with much criticism.  Yet, honest application of the test will provide 
a framework that will furnish more consistent results, while taking into 
account the purposes behind the Establishment Clause and religion’s 
role in modern society. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The Lemon and endorsement tests each contain inherent flaws and 
lead to inconsistent and incoherent results when applied to the facts of 
actual cases.  Furthermore, the holdings of Establishment Clause cases 
in which the Court employed these tests communicate to adherents of 
“majority” religions that their beliefs have little or no place in modern 
society.252  This is unacceptable when the government is to respect 
individuals’ religious liberty.  The Lemon and endorsement tests should 
therefore be abandoned. 
The original intent of the Framers with respect to the First Amendment, 
as well as the historical tradition of religion’s role in the United States, 
demonstrates that a modified coercion test should emerge in place of the 
Lemon and endorsement tests.  This modified coercion test finds that a 
violation of the First Amendment occurs when the government consistently 
 252. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 677 (1989) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part).  Justice Kennedy states: 
Although Justice O’Connor disavows Justice Blackmun’s suggestion that the 
minority or majority status of a religion is relevant to the question whether 
government recognition constitutes a forbidden endorsement, the very nature 
of the endorsement test, with its emphasis on the feelings of the objective 
observer, easily lends itself to this type of inquiry.  If there be such a person as 
the “reasonable observer,” I am quite certain that he or she will take away a 
salient message from our holding in these cases: the Supreme Court of the 
United States has concluded that the First Amendment creates classes of 
religions based on the relative numbers of their adherents.  Those religions 
enjoying the largest following must be consigned to the status of least favored 
faiths so as to avoid any possible risk of offending members of minority 
religions. 
Id. 




exposes observers to an obtrusive religious symbol.  This formulation 
ensures that the government will not establish a national religion or 
restrain individuals’ freedom of conscience in religious matters, without 
underestimating the importance of religious diversity and tolerance for 
differing beliefs.253
Accordingly, the modified coercion test provides a more consistent 
Establishment Clause framework by invalidating only those actions in 
which the government is engaged in that could lead to an establishment 
of religion or which work to curtail individual freedom.  A more 
consistent framework is achieved because the modified coercion test 
requires invalidating all actions where governmental activity undermines 
the principles behind the First Amendment, including practices that the 
Supreme Court has always upheld as constitutional. 
This reinforces the notion that although church and state should 
undoubtedly be kept separate, religion does not have to be completely 
removed from society.254 There is a place for religion in modern society, 
and the modified coercion test permits this. 
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 253. There are too many diverse groups in the United States for every person to 
agree with every act that occurs, every display that is erected, etc.  Allowing practices to be 
deemed unconstitutional because some people disfavor them hinders tolerance for diversity 
and runs the risk of eliminating religion from the public sphere altogether.  See, e.g., 
Charles J. Russo, Prayer at Public School Graduation Ceremonies: An Exercise in 
Futility or a Teachable Moment?, 1999 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 1, 20 (commenting on 
tolerance generally, but specifically with respect to prayer in public schools, that the 
government should encourage maintaining respect for various religious viewpoints).  
Russo asserts that it will be somewhat hypocritical for educators to attempt to foster 
appreciation for diversity generally if students are not permitted to be exposed to 
divergent religious viewpoints.  Id.  Even more important, Russo contends that it is 
dangerous to limit conversation on controversial issues if the United States is to grow as 
a nation.  Id. 
 254. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 45–46 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“The 
Establishment Clause does not require that the public sector be insulated from all things 
which may have a religious significance or origin.”); see also Michael J. Himes, Public 
Theology in Service to a National Conversation (2003) (unpublished paper, on file with 
author) (discussing a national conversation regarding religion’s place in the public 
arena).  Himes notes: 
Whether one applauds or deplores the fact, being a religious believer will, 
consciously or unconsciously, affect the way one votes, the kinds of public 
policies one endorses, and the kinds of social and economic commitments one 
makes.  The issue is not whether one’s theology influences one’s involvement in 
public life—it does, unless one is a thoroughly disintegrated human being—but 
rather whether we acknowledge and deal with the fact. 
Id. at 10; see also Laurie Messerly, Note, Reviving Religious Liberty in America, 8 NEXUS 
151, 164 (2003) (arguing that removing religion from public life has not only harmed 
America, but also would have been incomprehensible to the Framers because they 
believed that government could not survive without religion as a moral influence). 
